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ABSTRACT
This is an exploratory comparative study aimed to examine media frames about ongoing civil
war in Syria. The civil uprising started on March 15, 2011, and turned into a civil war after May
8, 2011. The conflict has lasted for more than four years, and more than 220,000 people have died
since it began. During the conflict, both the Syrian government and military opposition were
accused of extreme cruelty and of using chemical weapons. However, there was no official proof
of using chemical weapons until the August 21, 2013, when Syrian government forces used
chemical weapons during their attack on opposition forces.
After this attack, Russia and the United States of America reached an agreement on Syria.
According to the agreement, the Syrian government was obligated to remove the whole chemical
arsenal. If the condition was not met, the U.S. would intervene in the Syrian conflict.
The Syrian conflict is an international issue, and different media sources, journalists, political
and international actors may have various interpretations of the conflict. There are several reasons
that may cause differences in media coverage in events such as the Syrian crisis, with the cultural,
professional, political, and ideological landscapes that the media operates within being among a
few. This study is focused on the possible politico-ideological differences in the news coverage
that can be found in the Kommersant and the Financial Times in regard to the event of the chemical
attack that took place in Syria on August 21, 2013.
The study is based on the methodology for the framing analysis proposed by Robert Entman,
however it offers some amendments to Entman’s original framework. This study adds elements to
Entman’s methodology such as context, type of attitudes and judgments (personal vs. general),
sources of personal attitudes and judgments, the type of news sources used, the amount of sources
used for each story, and the length of the articles published by each newspaper.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECT

Thesis statement
This thesis studies politico-ideological differences between the frames employed by two
privately owned newspapers (the Financial Times and the Kommersant) in regard to the chemical
attack that occurred on August 21, 2013 during the Syrian crisis.

Purpose of the study
This thesis seeks to participate in the discussion on framing and framing studies and on
comparative framing studies in particular. This is an exploratory study that will lead to further
reorganization of the proposed methodology to elaborate a more systematic approach. It employs
Entman’s methodology as a base when analyzing media, which first identifies the issue, event, and
actors and then identifies the frame functions including problem, cause, remedy or solution, and
judgment or attitude. The study also adds to the methodology proposed by Entman by employing
the category of “context/rhetoric” to show the contextual environment or discourse in which the
categories proposed by Entman may be found. Additionally, the study looks at the type of attitudes
and judgment (personal vs. general) and the source of personal attitudes and judgment found in
the news articles, as well as focusing on the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used
for each story, and the length of the articles published both in the Financial Times and the
Kommersant.
This thesis is meant to show whether there are any differences in the coverage of the same
event by two newspapers located outside of the region where the event examined here took place,
thus this study analyzes and compares media frames employed by two newspapers when reporting
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on a distant international issue. The analysis in this study is based on the investigation of the
similarities and differences used in the articles published by both newspapers.
This study does not seek to explain the reasons of frame-building and the reasons of
employment of particular frames in any of the newspapers analyzed. However, using inductive
approach, the thesis offers possible perspectives that may be taken into account when attempting
to explain the way content was presented based on previous scholarly studies, and the political,
professional, and cultural contexts in which newspapers operate, in addition to the data received
during the analysis process.
Additional rationale
This thesis is meant to test the proposed framing analysis methodology in a comparative study
on an international issue. If proved to properly function, the methodological approach employed
in this study may be used for future comparative studies involving international conflicts and
controversies. The methodology used in this study is used to investigate politico-ideological
differences in the frames used by the Financial Times and the Kommersant in relation to the
chemical attack in Syria occurred on 21st of August 2013. The study’s focus on the Middle Eastern
issue is explained by the cultural and political diversity of the region and by its high conflict rate.
Additionally, a chemical attack is not an ordinary event and thus needs greater scrutiny and
attention.
Theoretical background
A vast array of literature on framing is centered on frame-building (e.g. Neuman et al., 1992;
Price et al., 1997; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Luther and Zhou, 2005; Vliegenthart & van
Zoonen, 2011) and on framing effects (e.g. Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1991; McLeod &
Detenber, 1999; Valkenburg et al., 1999; Zillmann et al., 2004). However, the reasons of framebuilding may be different. Some aspects may be omitted or highlighted due to the cultural
2

background of a journalist or editor (e.g. Carey, 1989 about cultural aspects in communication).
Another reason for differences in framing may be a result of the professional training of journalists
in a given country and various professional practices accepted in that country (e.g. van Cuilenburg
& van der Wurff, 2000). Also, ideological context may result in frame differences (about the role
of an ideology see Lull, 2000 for an example). Thus, different frames may be built both advertently
and inadvertently depending not only on the purpose of creating the story, but also on the context
that may have influenced the way the story is told and created.
Multiple works focused on ideological context that may result in different framing of
international issues exist today. Some of these works are centered on how ideological attitudes
influence the eventual frames in the news stories (e.g. Dimitrova & Lee 2009; Becker, 2011; Goltz,
2012). Others show how ideological differences in frames used about a particular international
event may evolve depending on changing context of an issue (e.g. Boaz, 2005; Parry, 2011). There
are also studies that focus on the subjective attitudes of a journalist or reporter regarding an issue
due to the ideological position of their information sources which results in eventual framing in
media (Kiousis & Wu, 2008; Stromback, et al. 2008; Wessler & Adolphsen, 2008; Kumar, 2010).
Thus, ideological differences in the frames that appear in news stories are of intense interest
to contemporary scholars in the field of media studies. One way to track possible ideological
differences and to show how frames may evolve within an issue is to conduct a comparative study
on framing using news created and published by media of different countries that may have distinct
ideological contexts and attitudes.

The context and background of the case
The civil uprising in Syria started on March 15, 2011 with anti-government protests during
the wave of the Arab Spring movement. In May 2011, the protests transformed into a full-scale
3

civil war. Since the conflict’s start, more than 11 million people have been forced to leave their
homes and more than 220,000 individuals have died. As of May 2015, the conflict is ongoing.
A United Nations commission of inquiry has reported multiple violations and war crimes
committed by both opposition and official government forces during the conflict – including
murder, torture, rape, and enforced disappearances.1
On August 21, 2013 the chemical attack near the city of Ghouta occurred. UN military experts
have since confirmed that the nerve agent sarin was used in the attack, which resulted in more than
1,300 people killed.2
Based on evidence gathered after the attack, the Human Rights Watch suggested that Syrian
governmental forces were most likely responsible for the chemical attack.3 The coalition, which
consisted of the U.S., United Kingdom, and France, leaned toward military response to the Syrian
regime, while Russia and China were against the use of military measures.
On August 28, the UK Parliament voted against the military action toward Syria, forcing the
UK Prime Minster David Cameron to withdraw from the coalition.4 As a result, France and the
U.S. did not officially decide on military response, and on September 14, 2013 the United States
and Russian Federation reached the agreement on destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal thus
excluding direct military action against the Syrian government.5

1

According to BBC conflict summary as of 05.2015: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868
According to BBC as of 05.2015: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399
3
Human Rights Watch official website: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-path
4
According to Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/30/us-syria-crisis-britainidUSBRE97R1BD20130830
5
According to the U.S. Department of State: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm
2
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Background on contemporary Russian and British political systems
Russian political background
Political background, as additional information, may be helpful for understanding the way
each newspaper presents the news content in the articles.
In Russia, the executive power is divided between the President and Prime Minister, but the
President is a dominant figure.6 The legislative branch in Russia is represented by the Federal
Assembly of Russia which has two chambers – The State Duma (the upper house) and The Council
of Federation (the upper house).7 The judicial power is administered by the Ministry of Justice.8
The president is the head of the state and is elected every 6 years, the government is split
between the several ministries accountable to the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President
and confirmed by State Duma. The Parliament is a bicameral assembly.9 The Council of Federation
consists of the representatives of Russia’s federal entities, while the State Duma consists of 450
deputies elected every five years through the proportional representation using party lists.10 Any
bills, including the bills proposed by the Council of Federation, must be first considered by State
Duma.11
Currently, the State Duma consists of four parties with the party of power, United Russia,
formally chaired by Dmitri Medvedev (previously was chaired by Vladimir Putin, before his
presidential election), controlling the total majority of seats (315 of 450).12 The other parties –
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR),

6

According to Russia Today as of 05.2015: http://russiapedia.rt.com/basic-facts-about-russia/political-system/
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
See BBC website for a detailed description in English: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15939801
7
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and Just Russia13 – have 58, 40, and 32 seats accordingly.14 Thus, the State Duma in its present
state may be seen as fully supportive of President Putin’s actions whose party is centrist and
conservative with a doctrine that includes political and socioeconomic stability and revival of
Russia as a world superpower.15
UK political background
The UK is a constitutional monarchy with the monarch being the head of state, but not the
governor of the country.16 The Prime Minister is a leader of government in which she or he rules
with the assistance of the Cabinet of Ministers.17 As a government head, the Prime Minster is
responsible for all policy decisions, she/he also has the authority to oversee the Civil Service and
government agencies, to appoint members of government, and is a principal figure in the House
of Commons.18
The Parliament is separate from government and consists of the House of Commons and
House of Lords.19 The Parliament is created for watching over the government and its actions, to
serve as a ground for debates and passing new laws, and set state taxes.20 The Members of the
House of Commons (MPs) are elected publicly and the party that has the largest number of
members elected forms the government.21 The members of the House of Lords are usually
appointed by the Queen based on the advice of the Prime Minister and complement the work of

“Just” is derived from “Justice”
See BBC website for a detailed description in English: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15939801
15
Ibid.
16
See the official website of the British monarchy:
http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/HowtheMonarchyworks/Whatisconstitutionalmonarchy.aspx
17
See official UK government website for more details: https://www.gov.uk/government/how-government-works
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
See official UK Parliament website: http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system/
13
14
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the House of Commons in scrutinizing the work of government and in making and amending
laws.22
Currently, the majority in the House of Commons is divided between the Conservatives (330
seats out of 650), Labor Party (232 out of 650), and Scottish National Party (56 out of 650). This
means that following the 2015 elections, the Conservative Party has the majority of the seats in
parliament.23 Compared to the previous Parliament composition from 2010 to 2015, the
Conservatives have received more seats and influence in the current Parliament.
According to the official website of the UK Parliament, in 2010-2015 Conservatives had 306
seats out of 650, the Labor Party had 258 seats out of 650, and Liberal Democrats had 57 seats out
of 650.24 Thus, the Labor Party and Liberal Democrats had an opportunity to oppose Conservatives
in the voting process at the House of Commons. This is important, because as mentioned
previously, UK Parliament voted against the proposition by Prime Minister David Cameron in
2013 to use military measures against the Syrian government after the chemical attack. David
Cameron has been the leader of the Conservative Party since 2005.25

Short note on the freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights in the Russian
Federation and the United Kingdom
The extent of the freedom of press, as well as of political and civil liberties in a given country
or region may have an impact on the way international and national events are covered by media.
In case of insufficient freedoms, press may experience significant influence from the government

22

See official UK Parliament website: http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system/
Ibid, http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/current-state-of-the-parties/
24
Ibid.
25
According to the official website of the UK Conservative Party: https://www.conservatives.com/OurTeam
23
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and dominant state ideology, as well as experience an extent of control and censorship employed
by the state.
The 2015 Freedom House report argues that Russia has a rating of 6.0 regarding the freedom
of the press, civil liberties, and political rights. According to the Freedom House, this is considered
“not free.”26 Compared to the 2013 report, the ratings for the freedom of the press, civil liberties,
and political rights were higher, but still showed that the country was “not free” according to the
Freedom House: the ratings were 5.5, 5, and 6 points accordingly.27
On the contrary, UK had a rating of 1.0 for the freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political
rights both in 2013 and 2015. 28, 29 If taken into account, this may mean that the press in the UK
may experience much less influence from the state and from the dominant state ideology. In
essence, this could mean that UK press experiences a lesser extent of control and censorship by
state than media in Russia.
Even in the event that the Freedom House ratings and reports are not completely accurate in
the evaluation, this information should still be taken into consideration when interpreting and
analyzing the data collected during the study.

26

2015 Freedom House report: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/russia#.VVpH2PlViko
2013 Freedom House report: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/russia#.VVpINflViko
28
2013 Freedom House report: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/unitedkingdom#.VVpLWvlViko
29
2015 Freedom House report: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/unitedkingdom#.VVpLFvlViko
27
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY BACKGROUND
Background on framing
When studying framing in media, researchers mostly understand it as a “salience” of certain
ideas or aspects of the topic (Entman, 2007; De Vreese, 2012). In addition, according to Chong &
Druckman (2007), the major premise of framing theory is that a certain issue may be perceived
from various perspectives and may also be “constructed as having implications for multiple values
or considerations” (p. 104). Thus, individuals may develop a certain conceptualization of an issue
or may change their ideas of an issue due to the framing process (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.
104). This may be true both for those who build and set the frames and for those who interpret the
frames that have been already offered. It is assumed by most framing studies that communicators
are elite actors, such as media, political actors, and experts, and that the audience consists of the
general public. However, it is unlikely that there is exclusively one-way influence from the frames
used and offered (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 117).
It is important to point out two frame types: “generic frames” and “issue-specific frames” (De
Vreese, 2012, p. 368). According to De Vreese (2012), issue-specific frames are related to specific
news events or topics, while generic frames may be found in broad topics, which may persist over
time and relate to multiple countries and cultures.
The sociological theoretical background of framing derives from Goffman (1974). The
concept of framing was first introduced into media studies in U.S. by Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin
(1980). Later, the concept of framing was discussed by Gamson & Modigliani (1987) and Entman
(1991).
Scheufele (2009) mentions macroscopic (sociological) and microscopic (psychological)
approach to framing. A macroscopic approach that is focused on studying “media frames as
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outcomes of journalistic norms or organizational constraints” is most commonly linked to the
attribution theory and frame analysis (p. 300). A microscopic approach to framing is focused on
studying the “individual means of processing and structuring incoming information” and is most
commonly found in the works on frames of reference and prospect theory (Scheufele, 2009, p.
301).
There are two concepts of framing that should be specified: media frames and audience frames
(Scheufele, 2009, p. 306). According to Gamson & Modigliani (1987), media frames refer to “a
central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events… The
frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). Scheufele (2009)
also mentions that “media or news frames serve as working routines for journalists, allowing them
to quickly identify and classify information and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences”
(p. 306). According to this concept of media framing the process of framing may be both
intentional and unintentional (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106). Audience frames are defined by Entman
(1993) as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (p.
53).
According to Scheufele (1999) there are two distinct frames of reference that may be used for
information interpretation and processing: “global and long-term political views and short-term,
issue related frames of reference” (p. 107). Continuing this thought, Scheufele (1999) argues that
global political views have rather limited influence on the perception and interpretation of the
political problems due to the fact that they are a result of certain personal characteristics of an
individual (p. 107). On the contrary, short-term, issue-related frames of reference may have
significant effects on how the incoming information is perceived, organized, and interpreted by
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individuals, as well as on how the inferences from this information are derived (Scheufele, 1999,
p. 107).
In his article, Scheufele (1999) argues that frames may be seen as independent and dependent
variables (p. 107). In cases when frames are studied as dependent variables, various factors that
may impact the modification or creation of frames are analyzed (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). Framing
of an issue by journalists may be influenced by various social-structural or organizational
variables, as well as by ideological and individual variables at the media level; while frames as
dependent variables at the audience level may be analyzed as a result of how mass media frame an
issue (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107).
In cases where frames are studied as independent variables, the focus usually is directed
toward the effects of framing (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). When considering media frames in this
case, scholars usually look on the relation of media frames to audience frames (Scheufele, 1999,
p. 107). When studying individual frames as independent variables the analysis focuses on whether
the individual farming of issues has an impact on how the issues or actors are evaluated and
whether the way individuals frame the issues themselves has an impact on the willingness of the
individuals to engage in action or participation (Scheufele, 1999, pp. 107-108).
Similar to the agenda-building, agenda-setting, and priming research, framing studies are
usually focused on one of the following processes: “frame-setting, frame-building, and individuallevel outcomes of framing” (Scheufele, 2009, p. 306). Frame-building is of a particular interest
here considering the media frame focus of this study and possible ideological differences between
the newspapers analyzed. Scheufele (2009) describes five different factors that may influence how
a particular issue is framed by journalists: “social norms and values, organizational pressures and
constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political
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orientations of journalists” (p. 307). To be more precise, journalists may construct frames based
on their attitudes, ideology, and organizational norms which may eventually be reflected in the
way news coverage is framed by journalists (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). The political orientation of
the medium itself may also have an impact on how the news information is framed, and various
external sources (e.g. political actors, authorities, interest groups and other elites) may impact the
way the information is framed in media (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). Scheufele (1999) also argues
that such influence on the frame-building process is mostly true for the new and recent issues for
which no particular frames have yet been established (p. 116). It is not yet clear whether journalists
simply reflect the frames offered by elites or various sources or whether journalists interpret the
issues themselves based on the information received form the news sources used (Scheufele, 1999,
p. 117).
According to Entman (1993), framing involves selection and salience. The researcher argues
that to frame means to select some aspects of the reality we perceive and to make them more salient
in a specific context promoting particular interpretations of an issue or problem (Entman, 1993, p.
52). Thus, any issue may be constructed based on various values and may be viewed from multiple
perspectives (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Some scholars argue that when presented in a
message, different frames might lead individuals to understanding and interpreting the issue
differently, because the frames highlight some aspects of reality while omitting others (Borah,
2011, p. 248). Following this logic, frames may encourage target audiences to think, feel, and
decide in a particular way (Entman, 2007, p. 164). For instance, Dimitrova and Lee (2009) say that
“framing of international events is especially important since the audience has no direct experience
with those events and, therefore, has to rely on media accounts to learn what happens in remote
places” (p. 538). According to Becker (2011) media usually report on distant foreign countries
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when “outstanding events are involved” and “when their foreign image undergoes historical
change” (Becker, 2011, p. 496). Thus, the way international issues are framed may impact public
opinion and audience cognitions (Dimitrova & Lee, 2009, p. 538). However, subtle nuances in
words and syntax may also have unintentional effects or effects that may be difficult to predict and
control by journalists (Scheufele, 2009, p. 309).
Druckman (2001) argues that in most cases scholars tend to find framing effects when they
are looking for them in their studies (p. 1061). However, there is “clear and systematic limit to
framing” which depends on the information source credibility, and according to Druckman (2001),
who described framing process in the context of audiences seeking guidance from credible elites,
credibility is a prerequisite element of successful framing (p. 1061). Thus, the information received
from a particular source may also influence how journalists and media present it in news offered
to general public.
According to Matthes (2009), there are several problems with the current work on framing
that should be considered before conducting a framing study. A few include a lack of operational
precision, descriptive focus of most studies, neglect of visual items, and insufficient reliability
reporting (p. 349). Matthes (2009) has undertaken a content analysis of 131 framing studies
published in major scholarly journals to show how frames are operationalized in the framing
literature and what frame really is. In his work, Matthes (2009) addresses four aspects of
conceptualizing and coding frames: “(1) definitions and how they are used for operationalization,
(2) the type of frames, (3) use of theory, and (4) the methods of frame analysis” (p. 350).
It is important to note, that for several units of analysis the scholars have used single or
multiple frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 350). Thus, one or several frames may be coded per single
article for the analysis purposes. For example, a single article may be used as separate discourse
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unit, but may have one or more frames that are coded depending on the particular methodology
used in a study. Also, as was mentioned above, frames have been conceptualized at different
abstraction levels: issue-specific or generic frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 350).
There are several points in the framing research that Matthes (2009) suggested researchers
critically reflect.
His first point was that framing definitions were not concrete as operational steps and were
not transparent in most of the literature. He stated that some of definitions offered were too general
and provided little information on how the frames should be operationalized (Matthes, 2009, p.
359). Also, some of the definitions were operationalized more precisely, but were not always
completely followed, which was mostly true for Entman’s definition where he suggests pointing
out such frame elements as problem definition, cause, moral judgment, and/or remedy (Matthes,
2009, p. 359).
Second, there is a conceptual divide between the generic and issue-specific frames, thus it is
necessary to specify how generic the frame should be to be classified as a generic frame: “Some
generic frames describe structural features of news items, such as conflict or personalization.
Others are related to features of topics and issues, such as the economic or the morality frame”
(Matthes, 2009, p. 360).
Matthes’ third point was that most framing studies are descriptive and do not test any
hypothesis in regard to the framing theory, which is mostly true for the studies analyzing issuespecific frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 360). In addition, there is a lack of reliability reporting in
multiple framing studies which may affect the validity of the results (Matthes, 2009, p. 360).
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Recent comparative framing studies on the Middle East
The tendency toward descriptiveness in comparisons of issue-specific frames was also found
in the recent comparative framing studies focused on the Middle East (e.g., Kara & Atabey, 2013;
Greenwood & Jenkins, 2013; Ha, 2015; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Sheafer & Dvir-Girsman, 2010). The
information presented in the articles tended to be qualitative describing certain trends found in the
sources of information analyzed. However, some works employed a mixed qualitative-quantitative
approach to data analysis (e.g., Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Evans, 2010).
The works also focused on how the information was presented and whether it contained any
comments from the local journalists. Mostly, the studies analyzed the differences between either
the U.S. and Middle Eastern media (e.g., Melki, 2014), the media from the same country (U.S.,
Cyprus, Korea, and others) (e.g., Kara & Atabey, 2013; Ha, 2015; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Evans,
2010), or the differences between various types of media (newspapers vs magazines) on the
international conflict in the Middle East (e.g., Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). No
comparisons between Russian and the UK newspapers were found in recent articles about Middle
Eastern conflicts.
The studies employed different methodological approaches to analyze the frames and mostly
used methods that may not be employed for analyzing other events. Thus, they are single event
focused. On the contrary, the present study aims to test the methodology that may be used to
analyze other international conflicts as well, making it multi-event focused in the methodology it
offers.
Below is a brief overview of some recent studies related to the conflicts in the Middle East to
show what has been researched by scholars previously.
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Nurten Kara & Melek Atabey (2013) analyzed how North Cypriot press reported on the Iraq
and Lebanon wars. The authors analyzed two local newspapers Kibris and Afrika and showed that
although most of the information was sourced from the news agencies (the author did not specify
what news agencies were used), journalists used local context and local focus to frame the issues
in the local media (Kara & Atabey, 2013). The author emphasized the dependence of news
coverage about the international conflicts and issues on the local context (Kara & Atabey, 2013,
p. 174).
Keith Greenwood & Joy Jenkins (2013) studied visual framing of international news in news
and public affairs magazines and argue that international news is frequently visually framed in
terms of violence and disaster. The researchers also argue that visual framing on war and peace
may reflect differing political orientations among various publications based on editorial/political
positions of each medium (Greenwood & Jenkins, 2013). This trend was also mentioned in the
article by Jae Sik Ha (2015), who compared the frames on the Arab Spring uprising in the major
South Korean newspapers.
Ha (2015) qualitatively analyzed the difference between the frames offered by liberal and
conservative newspapers on the issue in Korea and suggested that ideological differences of news
outlets had a significant influence on the opinion discourses. The author argues that ideological
orientation of media outlets that show distinct ideological positions and perspectives on the same
issue may also impede the objective presentation of issues on the international events such as Arab
Spring, even within the same country (Ha, 2015). The author argues that factors such as dominant
ideologies, national or economic interests, national history and context, and international relations
that may have an impact on the media representation of a social movement are still not well-studied
(Ha, 2015, p. 1). Probably, this is also true for the representation of a distant social movement as
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well as for the representation of other distant international issues, such as international and military
conflicts, civil wars, terrorist attacks, or even political processes that occur in other countries and
are reported in media of foreign countries.
According to Ha (2015) newspaper companies in South Korea are mostly private and are
outside the direct governmental influence. However, Ha argues that starting in the 1980s
newspapers in Korea began framing events based on different ideologies. Ha says this could be
the result of media owners and journalists having had considered themselves enablers of political
power rather than watchdogs of government and corporations (Ha, 2015, p. 4). The author reflected
a trend of Korean media narratives reflecting the content based on Korean national interests,
dominant ideology, and the orientation of news organizations, thus “domesticating the world” (pp.
14-15).
Zeng & Tahat (2012) analyzed the coverage of terrorism on Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya
websites. The study found that terrorism was mostly framed as a “Muslim” phenomenon even by
the two major Arabic websites, although terrorists are not necessarily are Muslims (Zeng & Tahat,
2012, p. 444). The authors also found that Al Arabiya mostly relied on government officials as
news sources when covering the events (thus being closer to the Western standards of media
coverage according to authors) while Al Jazeera used other sources as well and tended to cover
more regions of the world in relation to the terrorism issues, not only the Middle East and North
America (Zeng & Tahat). The authors also argue that insufficient media coverage on terrorism was
presented from the humanitarian perspective, and that the media employed mostly military and
official frames to cover the issues related to terrorism (Zeng & Tahat, 2012, p. 445).
Dimitrova & Konnolly-Ahern (2007) have examined the coverage of the Iraq war in the U.S.,
UK, Qatar, and Egyptian media and have shown that the “tale of war” was constructed differently
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by the distinct international media (p. 153). The researchers argue that Arab media employed
mostly military conflict and violence of war frames, while the Coalition media mostly used the
rebuilding of Iraq frame (Dimitrova & Konnolly, 2007, p. 153). The authors argue that media
institutions operate based on the sociopolitical environment in which they are rooted, as well as
the differences in the tone of media coverage in regard to a certain issue may be a result of
dominant journalistic values that prevail in a certain region (Dimitrova & Konnolly, 2007, pp. 162163).
Evans (2010) compared the frames in the New York Times on two international conflicts (one
in the town of Jenin in the West Bank in 2002 and another in Nahr al-Bared in Lebanon in 2007).
The author employed the methodology proposed by Robert Entman (2004) that suggests analyzing
issues in terms of events that took place, the actors involved, and the moral judgments conveyed
(Evans, 2010, p. 2013). In his article Evans (2013) argues that media affects policy-makers both
indirectly and directly (p. 226). According to Evans (2013), media affects policy-makers indirectly
through its impact on public opinion and directly “by structuring their perceptions of reality” that
are based on the information received through the elite media publications such as the New York
Times (Evans, 2013, pp. 225-226). However, the author focuses on media affecting foreign policy
and does not entirely assume that the frames offered by the media publications may also be affected
directly and indirectly by policy-makers, various information sources used for the stories, as well
as by ideological orientations of journalists and editors, and by the social, political, historical, and
cultural context in which these elite publications are rooted.
Similarly to the studies mentioned above, the study by Jad Melki (2014) reflected the
differences and strong regional trends in media coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war among
11 networks from the U.S., Israeli, and Arab world (p. 177). Melki focused on the media framing
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effects on public opinion arguing that the way information is presented in media may have an
impact on how the audience thinks of the events (Melki, 2014, p. 165). The study has shown the
strong concordance between the frames found in the U.S. and Israeli media reflecting Israeli
national interests, while showing the Arab networks offering framing generally supportive to
Hezbollah, although there were differences in the way the information was presented in the Arab
media (Melki, 2014, p. 177). The author explains the existence of distinct regional trends by the
interplay of political, cultural, and economic factors that confined journalistic practices of each
television network analyzed in regard to the conflict (Melki, 2014, p. 165).
As can be seen from the short review presented here of the recent articles related to media
framing in regard to the Middle East region, most studies have focused on possible framing effects
or biases (such as national interests, culture, socio-economic context, “domestication of news”,
and others), as well as on frame types that might be found in the sources. However, in every study
little attention was paid to deeply analyzing the possible factors for explaining the ideological
differences between the sources or the reasons why the information is presented in a particular
way. The ideological profiles of the newspapers were sometimes predefined and the assumption
that the information was often presented based on the national interests and based on the official
governmental position, or on the position of the editor which can be concordant with one of the
political forces in the country was taken for granted, although this may be just one of the possible
reasons that might or might not influence the eventual representation of the information in media.
Based on these studies, the question remains of why exactly the information was presented in each
news source in one way or another. Additionally, the studies mostly focused on the comparison
itself, but not directly on the factors that might have an impact on the media frame-building.
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It may be inferred from recent works on media framing of the Middle Eastern events, that
there may be some regional trends in reporting that are based on local ideological, political,
cultural, and professional context. To explain the way the news is framed by a particular medium,
further research should probably consider analyzing to what extent media frames in regard to a
particular event are affected by one of the regional factors and trends. However, this is out of the
scope of this study.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
This is an exploratory comparative study of framing in media which is aimed to test the
proposed methodology in order to reorganize it and to come up with a more systematic approach
for the future studies. The focus of this study is on media frames and politico-ideological
differences between two newspapers. This study is focused on analyzing ideological differences
in the frames used in news about the Syrian crisis. For the purpose of the study, two newspapers
have been chosen. One newspaper is Russian – the Kommersant and the other is British – the
Financial Times. Both newspapers specialize reporting about financial markets, international and
national politics, and international issues. Both newspapers are privately owned, which is thought
to reduce the effects of political parallelism and intervention of any particular political actors in
the news creating process. Both newspapers have comparable circulation and are published daily.
In 2013, the Financial Times had a daily circulation of approximately 275,000 copies, while the
Kommersant maintained a daily circulation between 120,000 and 130,000 copies.
To analyze frames, the methodology proposed by Robert Entman (2004) was used. Entman
(2004) suggests analyzing events within the issue by identifying functions of frames. In his book,
Entman (2004) suggests analyzing frames identifying an issue, event, and actors (e.g. individuals,
groups, nations, etc.). After each is identified, Entman (2004) suggests identifying frame functions
to analyze the frame. Frame functions consist of four steps: defining problematic effects/conditions
(Problem / What is going on?); identifying cause/agent (Why? / Who?); endorsing remedy (What
to do? / How to resolve? / What is suggested?); conveying moral judgment (Evaluation. Who is
good, bad, neutral, etc.? What is right and wrong? Why is it right or wrong?) (see. Entman, 2004,
p. 23-24).
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The study employed both inductive and deductive approach to identify and to analyze the
frames. The frames were analyzed using manual coding.
According to Semetko & Valkenburg (2000), “the inductive approach involves analyzing a
news story with an open view to attempt reveal the array of the possible frames” (p. 94). On the
contrary, the deductive approach involves using a predefined set of frames to measure to what
extent these frames may be found in the news stories (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). Thus,
it is necessary to have a clear idea regarding the kind of frames that might be present in the news
stories if employing a deductive approach (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). Otherwise, any
frames that may not have been defined earlier in the process could be overlooked during the
analysis process (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). The authors (Semetko & Valkenburg,
2000) argue that the deductive approach may be easily replicated and may cope with large samples
(p. 94).
In regard to the predefined frames, Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) offered five different
frames that were found in the previous studies on framing: attribution of responsibility, conflict,
human interest, economic consequences, and morality (p. 93). Notwithstanding the possibility that
these frames may be generic and found in most of the news stories, the present study did not use
the categorization offered by Semetko & Valkenburg. The reason for choosing the inductive
approach and for refusing to employ the above categorization is explained by the nature of the
topic chosen for the analysis.
First, the Syrian crisis was a recent issue by the time the analysis was performed and required
more scrutiny and flexibility in analyzing it. Second, the Syrian crisis is a separate type of event –
it is and international conflict and thus the categorization offered by Semetko & Valkenburg does
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not fully suit the purposes of analysis due to the fact that some important frames may have been
overlooked when adhering strictly to the existing categories.
This study employs Entman’s methodology as a starting point and a base, but adds some
additional elements to it. In addition to the elements offered by Entman, this study also employs
the category of “context/rhetoric” to show the contextual environment or discourse in which the
categories proposed by Entman may be found. The study also looks at the type of
attitudes/judgments (personal vs. general) and the source of personal attitudes/judgments found in
the stories; as well as on the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used for each story,
and the length of articles published both in the Financial Times and the Kommersant.
In addition, this study adheres to the recommendations offered in the article by Chong &
Druckman (2007) where the scholars describe several steps necessary to measure media frames.
According to Chong & Druckman (2007), first, an issue or an event should be identified, because
it is only possible to identify a frame in communication in relation to a particular issue, event, or
political actor (p. 106). After the issue or event is identified, it is necessary to “isolate a specific
attitude” in case the study aims to understand how the frames affect public opinion (Chong &
Druckman 2007, p. 106). Then, to create a coding scheme, an initial set of frames of an issue may
be identified inductively and after the initial set of frames is identified, the sources for the content
analysis should be selected (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 107). Most typically, the sources for the
content analysis are articles or stories that are identified via searches using key words and are
usually used as units of analysis (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 107). Manual coding allows greater
flexibility and makes it possible to discover new frames that were not identified during the initial
manual coding scheme (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 108).
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In this case, government officials representing predefined international actors (USA, UK, EU,
Russia, and China) were set as units of analysis, thus allowing for analyzation of several different
frames per article, if present. The officials representing these particular international actors were
chosen during the preliminary stage of the analysis using inductive approach.
The issue for the analysis was civil war in Syria and the event chosen for the analysis was the
chemical attack that occurred on August 21, 2013. This study analyzes and compares what
information was used to describe the same events by the Financial Times and by the Kommersant.
The time frame for the analysis is set from the day of the chemical attack on August 21,
2013 to the beginning of the G-20 summit in Russia on September 4, 2013. As a result of the
summit, which ended on September 14, 2013, the Syrian government was obliged to remove the
whole chemical arsenal.
The articles for analysis were selected using the search word “Syria” (English) and “Сирия”
(Russian). To find the Financial Times articles, Lexis Nexis Acadiemic English language online
archive was used. To find the Kommersant articles, the Russian version of the newspaper’s website
was used.
The preliminary stage of the analysis showed that these international actors were the major
political players in regard to the chemical attack in Syria. The U.S., UK, and EU as political actors
represented the coalition against the official Syrian regime, while Russia and China as political
actors became the main antagonists to the coalition after imposing veto on the UN Security
Council’s resolution on Syria supported by the coalition. For this reason, the officials representing
the USA, UK, EU, Russia, and China were chosen as the units of analysis.
After the international actors were chosen, deductive approach was employed to analyze the
articles (news stories and analyses excluding comments and editorials). During this stage, the
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researcher first looked for such search elements as predefined international actors involved in the
event (USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China), the chemical attack of August 21, 2013
mentioned in the stories, and international decisions regarding the chemical attack described in the
article. According to these search elements, a set of articles from each newspaper was chosen for
the analysis.
When the set of articles was chosen, the analysis was performed for each government official
and international actor (i.e. USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China) found in a given
article. Some articles contained several international actors and government officials mentioned in
the text and thus required a separate analysis for each of the actors mentioned which may lead to
a more accurate data and interpretation.
During the analysis process, the researcher looked for such additional elements and
categories as:
1. The context used to describe the international actors and government officials
affiliated to the event
2. The information emphasized in the articles in regard to the chemical attack
3. The sources used in the articles
4. The characteristics of the people mentioned in the articles
5. Whether there are any attitudes in the article and whether the attitudes are negative,
positive, neutral, or balanced. Whether there are any personal attitudes in the article.
Whether there is a source of the personal attitudes (e.g. journalist, expert, official, etc.)
Whether any particular officials are used as sources of personal attitudes (UK, EU,
U.S., Russian, Chinese)
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The study employed manual coding to allow greater flexibility during the analysis process. A
coding sheet that may be found in the appendix was created to facilitate the data gathering process.
The data gathered during the analysis was coded in the SPSS. After all variables were entered, a
set of tables and figures showing descriptive statistics of the data collected was created in SPSS.
This study used no inter-coder reliability and is considered a pilot exploratory study; it was
necessary first to test the methodological approach employed in this work to see to what extent it
may be used for the data collection and what should be amended in the methodological tool for
the use in further studies.
To compare the frames in two newspapers, the study used the following research questions:
RQ1: Will the Financial Times frame Syrian opposition in a more positive way than the
Kommersant?
RQ2: Will the Kommersant frame Syrian authorities in a more positive way than the Financial
Times?
RQ3: Will the Kommersant frame Russian and Chinese officials in a more positive way than
the Financial Times?
RQ4: Will the Financial Times frame U.S., UK, and EU officials more positively than the
Kommersant?
RQ5: Which of the newspapers will emphasize sanctions and military measures toward Syrian
authorities among the possible solutions to the issue?
RQ 6: Is there any information covered by one newspaper and that is not covered by the other?
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Conceptualization
There were several concepts used in the analysis process that should be explained and defined
to set the scope of their meanings in relation to this study:
Negative involves words, statements, and attitudes that describe an international or individual
actor, situation and/or event, or a particular solution or action in an unkind way or are directed
against the particular outcome, actor, or solution (e.g. direct accusations; obscene vocabulary;
caustic wordings; calls against the particular actor and/or solution; opposition to a certain action,
proposition, or solution).
Example: “A senior western official told the Financial Times that the U.S., Britain and France
were strongly of the view that they needed to deliver a military response to the attack in order to
deter the Assad regime from using chemical weapons again” (the Financial Times, 08.25.2013).
Positive involves words, statements, and attitudes that describe an international or individual
actor, situation and/or event, or a particular solution or action in a kind or supportive way or are
directed in favor of the particular outcome, actor, or solution (e.g. direct acclaims; polite and
friendly vocabulary; soft and supportive wordings; calls in favor of a particular actor and/or
solution; support for a certain action, proposition, or solution).
Example: “Mr. Hollande told his US counterpart that “everything was consistent with naming
the Damascus regime as the author” of the chemical attacks, according to a statement by the French
government on Sunday. The statement said that the two presidents “agreed to stay in close contact
to arrive at a joint response to this unprecedented aggression” (the Financial Times, 08.25.2013).
Neutral involves no particular tone or wordings that are supporting or blaming either of the
sides or actors mentioned in the article, and involves no direct endorsement or condemnation of a
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particular attitude or solution; this means being impartial in presenting the content in the article
thereby reflecting the information without emotional or ideological connotation.
Example: “The U.S. does not plan to involve in a large-scale operation in Syria in case the
evidence of using the chemical weapons by the official forces will be provided. According to the
Washington Post, the authorities may use missile strikes that will last no more than two days.
According to the source, U.S. military forces are ready for the operation and are awaiting for the
corresponding order” (translated from Russian from the Kommersant, 08.27.2013).
Balanced means taking several perspectives into account, fairly judged or presented. This
means not endorsing a particular attitude or solution, but mentioning several solutions to the
problem; presenting information considering various points of view, but not simply neutrally
reflecting the fact.
Example: “In the next few days, the U.S. is likely to find itself in a new war of words with the
Assad regime over what happened last week. After days of stalling, the regime looks likely to give
UN inspectors access to the site in eastern Damascus. On the other hand, the US will argue that
this is too late because evidence of a chemical attack on the ground has degraded” (the Financial
Times, 08.25.2013).
General attitude means that no particular individual (e.g. government official, journalist, or
expert) can be identified as a source of expression, and is thus non-personal.
Example: “The UK is to present a draft resolution to the UN Security Council on Wednesday
condemning an alleged chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime in eastern Damascus and
authorizing “necessary measures to protect civilians” (the Financial Times, 08.28.2013).
Personal attitude means that a particular individual (e.g. government official, journalist,
expert) may be identified as a source of expression.
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Example: “After careful deliberation I have decided the United States should take military
action against Syrian targets,” Mr. Obama said” (the Financial Times, 08.30.2013).
Political rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in the
article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown in
the situation of external and/or internal governmental solutions and/or competition in regard to the
issue.
Example: “Mr. Kerry is spearheading the administration's lobbying effort, at home and abroad,
even though Mr. Obama did not consult him before deciding at the weekend to take the issue to
Congress for a vote” (the Financial Times, 09.02.2013).
Militaristic rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in
the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown
in the situation of discussing or endorsing the aggressive measures toward the cause of the
problem.
Example: “Mr. Hollande said: “The chemical massacre in Damascus cannot remain
unpunished. If not, it would risk an escalation that would trivialise the use of these weapons and
would threaten other countries.” He said he did not favour a military operation to overthrow Mr.
Assad but a deterrent strike to punish” (the Financial Times, 08.30.2013).
Diplomatic rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in
the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown
in the situation of discussing or endorsing the conciliatory measures toward the cause of the
problem.
Example: “It is not beneficial for the Syrian government from the political and also from the
military point of view to use chemical weapons. When the UN experts were working there (in
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Syria – the Kommersant) the military state was in favor of the government, and the U.S. - Russian
meeting for the preparation of the “Zheneva-2” conference should take place, – Mr. Lavrov
specified” (the Kommersant, 08.27.2013).
Humanitarian rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions
in the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown
in the situation describing war suffering of the civil population and/or solutions to resolve this
suffering.
Example: “The plane with humanitarian aid was sent to Syria by the Russian Ministry of
Emergency Situations. Russian citizens who are willing to leave the country will be able to use the
plane on its way back” (the Kommersant, 08.27.2013).
Local journalist/correspondent refers to the content author employed by or affiliated with one
of the newspapers analyzed who resides in the country where the newspaper originates from and/or
creates news content not leaving the country of residence, either UK or Russia.
Foreign journalist/correspondent refers to the content author employed by or affiliated with
one of the newspapers analyzed who resides outside the country where the newspaper originates
from and creates news content while staying outside the newspaper’s country of origin, either UK
or Russia.
Local expert a person with an in-depth knowledge in one of the fields who is based and/or
resides in the newspaper’s country of origin, either UK or Russia.
Foreign expert a person with an in-depth knowledge in one of the fields who is not based
and/or does not reside in the newspaper’s country of origin, either UK or Russia.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
A total of 361 articles from the Financial Times (further in text as FT) and 332 articles from
the Kommersant (further in text as K) were analyzed during this study to answer the research
questions. There were a total of 938 references in both newspapers in all articles analyzed that
corresponded with the defined criteria. The criteria included predefined international actors
involved in the event (USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China), the chemical attack of
August 21, 2013 mentioned in the articles, and international decisions regarding the chemical
attack described in the article. In order to address the research questions, it is necessary first to
show the general information about the issue and actors involved in the issue and the extent to
which these actors were mentioned in each newspaper.
General context
It may be seen from Figure 1 in the appendix30 that both newspapers have two similar time
periods within the analysis time frame when the number of articles related to the issue of the
chemical attack in Syria increased. These periods lasted from August 26, 2013 until August 30,
2013 and from September 1, 2013 to September 4, 2013.
According to Figures 2 and 3, both newspapers mentioned USA more frequently than other
international actors (44.34% in K and 35.81% in FT). Second position among the most mentioned
international actors in K is given to Russia (17.92%) and in FT to the UK (32.1%). Both USA and
UK in FT have approximately 70% combined. Both newspapers mentioned EU with an almost
equal rate – 16.67% in K and 17.9% in FT. The fourth position is allocated to the UK in K with
15.72% and to Russia in FT with 9.335% being the number of times mentioned in the articles
related to the chemical attack in Syria. There is almost a 30% difference between the most
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This and all other figures may be found in the appendix.
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frequently mentioned international actor and the second most popular one in K, while the
difference between the first two actors in FT is less than 4%. The difference between the second
and fourth most popular actors in K is less than 3%. K introduces a “collective” actor named
“West” which is on the 5th place with approximately 3.5% of times mentioned. China is placed on
the 5th position in FT (4.839%) and on the 6th position in K (1.887%).
Figures 4 and 5 show the total amount of international actors per article mentioned in each
newspaper. FT and K differ significantly by these criteria. In FT, in 28.91% of cases there was
only one international actor mentioned per article, while in K the sole international actor was found
in 60.49% of all articles analyzed. The appearance of two, three, four, or five actors per article in
FT has almost the same frequency. The difference between the most frequent cases (two or three
actors per article) and the least frequent cases (four or five actors per article) is within 2.5% starting
from 18.75% of cases with two and three actors and ending with 17.19% and 16.41% with four
and five actors. On the contrary, the difference between the first and second position in K is more
than 35% and the difference between the second and third position is more than 15%. Two and
three actors were mentioned in K 24.07% and 8.642% of times correspondingly.
The Figures 6 and 7 show what members of the European Union except the UK were
mentioned in both newspapers in relation to the chemical attack in Syria. France and Germany
were among the first two most frequently mentioned EU members in both FT and K. France was
mentioned in 66.67% of cases in K and in 67.27% of cases in FT. Germany was mentioned in
19.61% of cases in K and in 25.45% of cases in FT. Italy is on the third position in FT with 7.273%
of cases, while Greece is on the third position in K with less than 4% of cases. There were also
other EU members mentioned in K, however each of them was mentioned in less than 2% of cases
(see Figure 6 for more details).
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Figures 8 and 9 reflect the context found in all articles analyzed from both newspapers.
Militaristic context was found most frequently both in FT and K with 48.53% and 57.55% of cases
accordingly. The second position in both newspapers is allocated to political context with 45.26%
of cases in FT and 28.93% of cases in K. Diplomatic context was found on the third position with
6.046% of cases in FT and in 13.52% of cases in K. Thus, militaristic context/rhetoric was found
in approximately 7% more cases in K than in FT (see Figures 8 and 9 in the appendix for more
details).
Figures 10 and 11 reflect the number of persons mentioned per article in K and FT
accordingly. There is a drastic difference in both newspapers as shown on the diagrams.
Approximately 70% of the Kommersant articles have none or only one person mentioned in the
text. Two persons were mentioned in approximately 17% of cases while three persons were
mentioned in less than 6% of articles in The Kommersant. Combined, the above numbers make
more than 90% of all cases analyzed in K for the purposes of this study.
On the contrary, one or no persons were mentioned in The Financial Times in approximately
17% of cases, while four, two, and six persons per article were mentioned in 19.08%, 16.7%, and
13.74% of cases accordingly. Both three and five persons per article appeared in 10.69% each in
all cases analyzed.
Responsibility for the attack
There is also a significant difference in each newspaper reflecting who was responsible for
the chemical attack. Thus, almost 86% of articles from FT name Syrian official forces as a cause
of the attack, while K mentions Syrian official forces as a cause of the attack in 58.49% of cases.
In almost 40% of cases K does not define who exactly was responsible for the accident, while FT
does not name the responsible party in less than 15% of articles. Syrian rebels are mentioned as
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responsible for the attack in less than 2% of cases in both newspapers (see Figures 12 and 13 for
details).
Figures 14 and 15 show overall attitudes toward the cause of the attack. More than 40% of
articles show balanced attitude toward the possible cause of the attack in K, while neutral and
negative attitudes are expressed toward the cause of the accident in approximately 30% of cases
each.
Of all attitudes toward the case of the attack in FT, 55.81% are negative, while approximately
44% of cases show balanced attitudes toward the party responsible for the chemical attack.
Personal attitudes were found in 77.26% of cases in FT, while in K personal attitudes toward
the cause of the attack were found in 47.48% of all articles. General attitudes constitute 22.74% of
all cases in FT and 52.52% of cases in K. For both variables, there was approximately a 30%
difference in the type of attitudes between two newspapers. This information is shown on Figures
16 and 17 in the appendix.
There were several categories describing the personal attitudes toward the cause of the attack
in both newspapers which are shown on Figures 18 and 19 in the appendix. According to Figure
18 the following categories of actors expressed personal attitudes in the Kommersant: U.S. official
(46.41%), Russian official (22.22%), UK official (14.38%), EU official (9.8%), Russian expert
(6.536%), Russian journalist (less than 1% of cases). In the Financial Times (figure 19), there were
a total of 10 different categories of actors expressing personal attitudes toward the cause of the
attack: U.S. official (36.25%), UK official (31.88%), EU official (16.04%), Russian official
(6.667%), foreign journalist (3.333%), UK expert (less than 3%), UK journalist (less than 2%),
foreign expert (less than 1,5%), Chinese official (less than 1.5%), Russian expert (less than 1%).
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Solutions to the situation and information sources
There were several solutions to the situation mentioned in both newspapers. Figures 20 and
21 show the solutions described in FT and K. Among the most frequently mentioned solutions in
FT are the following: “Military measures” (54.35%), “Postpone or abandon military measures”
(21.29%), “Discuss the situation in Syria” (15.16%), and “Check the evidence of attack” (6.13%).
The most frequently described solutions in K were the following: “Military measures” (49.69%),
“Discuss the situation in Syria” (12.89%), “No solution” (12.58%), “Postpone or abandon military
measures” (8.18%), “Check the evidence of attack” (7.55%), “Find a diplomatic solution”
(7.23%).
Figures 22 and 23 show breakdown by the type of personal attitudes toward all solutions
mentioned in both newspapers. For the purposes of more detailed explanations, it might be
important to understand who exactly expressed personal attitudes toward the solutions to the
situation in each newspaper.
According to the data gathered from FT, 36.01% of personal attitudes about the solutions were
given by U.S. officials, 30.45% of personal attitudes were given by UK officials, 15.84% were
provided by EU officials, 7.4% were given by Russian officials, and 4.53% of attitudes were
expressed by foreign journalists. Other categories, such as UK experts, UK journalists, Chinese
officials, foreign experts, or Russian experts were found in less than 2% of cases each.
In K, U.S. officials expressed their attitudes toward the solutions to the situation in 45.78% of
cases, Russian officials expressed their attitudes in 21.69% of cases, personal attitudes given by
UK officials were found in 13.86% of cases, EU officials expressed their personal attitudes in
12.05% of cases, while Russian experts gave their attitudes for a solution of the situation in 6.02%
of cases. Russian journalists expressed their attitudes in less than 1% of articles analyzed.
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It is important to understand the sources of information provided in the articles in both
newspapers for data explanation purposes. According to Figure 24, most of the information in K
came from a Russian news agency (43.21%), Russian correspondent (27.16%), U.S. news agency
(11.11%), secondary information source (9.88%), and the EU news agency (4.98%).
Most popular information sources in FT, according to the Figure 25, were a UK correspondent
(62.32%), U.S. correspondent (23.91%), EU correspondent (5.79%), and Middle East
correspondent (4.34%).
It is also important to understand how many sources were used per article in both newspapers.
According to Figure 26, one source of information was used in 44.2% of cases in FT, three
information sources were used in 25.36% of cases, and two information sources were used in
24.64% of all articles analyzed. Four, five, and six information sources were used in less than 3%
of articles each.
Figure 27 shows the amount of information sources used in K per article. One information
source was used in 70.99% of articles, two information sources were used in 24.07% of cases, and
three information sources were used in 4.32% of all articles analyzed. Four information sources
were used in less than 1% of all articles analyzed in K.
Article length is also an important factor to consider when analyzing the information presented
in each article.
Figure 28 shows that 52.5% of all articles analyzed in K consisted of less than 100 words,
17.5% of articles had 100-200 words in the text, while articles with more than 500 words were
found in 10.63% of cases, and those consisting of 300-400 words were found in 7.5% of cases. K
articles consisting of 400-500 words equated to 6.87% and those consisting of 200-300 were 5
percent.
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In FT, 93.48% of articles consisted of more than 500 words, 4.35% consisted of 400-500
words, and 2.17% of articles had 300-400 words in the text. This can be seen in Figure 29.
Actors and attitudes toward the solutions to the situation
At this point, it is important to show who were the international officials mentioned in the
articles of both newspapers. According to Figure 30, there were thirty different officials mentioned
in the Kommersant articles. The most popular among them were: Barack Obama (23.41%), John
Kerry (9.76%), David Cameron (9.27%), Chuck Hagel and Sergei Lavrov (8.29% each), Vladimir
Putin (5.85%), Alexandr Lukashevich and an “undefined actor” (3.9% each). Other actors were
found in less than 3% of cases.
Figure 31 shows the most popular officials mentioned in FT. The officials mentioned in most
articles were Barack Obama (15.63%), David Cameron (14.65%), Francois Hollande (8.98%),
John Kerry (7.03%), William Hague (5.08%), and with less than 4 percent each, Ed Miliband,
Chuck Hagel, Vladimir Putin, John Boehner, and Douglas Alexander.
Further data show the attitudes toward the particular cause of the chemical attack mentioned
in both newspapers.
It may be seen from Table 1 in the appendix31, that in 55.3% of cases there were negative
attitudes toward the Syrian official forces found in FT, while negative attitudes toward the same
possible cause of the attack were found in 26.4% of cases in K. Both newspapers show similar
numbers with balanced attitudes to all possible causes of the attack (42.5% in K and 43.7% in FT).
It may also be seen that there were only a few attitudes toward the Syrian rebels (less than 2% of
cases in K and less than 1% of cases in FT), which are not statistically significant values. More
than 35% of attitudes combined in K were toward the “undefined” cause of the attack, while FT
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This and all other tables may be found in the appendix
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only had more than 13% of attitudes combined toward the “Undefined” cause. The “Undefined”
cause of the attack had mostly neutral (14.5%) and balanced (23.3%) attitudes in K.
Table 2 shows the attitudes to the military measures as the possible cause of the attack offered
by each international actor. According to the table, the U.S., EU, and UK expressed positive
attitudes toward the military measures in 81.1%, 82%, and 71.4% of cases in FT. The same actors
expressed positive attitudes toward the military measures in fewer cases in K. The numbers were
46.2%, 54.8%, and 57.7% accordingly. There was an additional international actor “West”
introduced in K with 20% of positive, 60% of neutral, and 20% of balanced attitudes toward the
military measures against the cause of the attack. It is also important to mention that there were no
neutral attitudes toward this type of solution in FT.
Table 3 below shows the data on the attitudes toward checking the evidence of attack. There
were only 64 of valid cases in all data set related to this solution, which is 6.6% of all the cases
analyzed in both newspapers.
In K, Russia was the actor who expressed most of the positive attitudes toward this type of
solution (61.5%). There were even more positive attitudes toward this solution expressed by Russia
in FT (92.3%). The UK and China also expressed mostly positive attitudes to this solution with
80% and 100% correspondingly. The U.S. (71.4%), UK (100%), and EU (100%) expressed mostly
balanced attitudes in K, while only the EU showed similar numbers for the balanced attitude in FT
(75%). The total amount of balanced attitudes in K was 58.3%, while they constituted 18.4% in
FT. Positive attitudes combined constituted 71.1% in FT and 41.7% in K.
Table 4 provides the data regarding the solution to postpone or abandon military measures
toward the possible cause of the chemical attack.
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Most of the attitudes toward this solution in K were balanced (69.2%) while in FT most of the
attitudes were positive (71.2%). Positive attitudes toward abandoning or postponing military
measures in K were expressed by EU (20%) and Russia (14.3%). Most of the neutral attitudes
toward the solution in K were expressed by China (100%), EU (40%), and Russia (28.6%). The
U.S. (100%), UK (88.9%), and Russia (57.1%) mostly expressed balanced attitudes toward the
solution in K.
In FT, there were no neutral attitudes expressed by the international actors. Negative attitudes
were expressed by the UK (7.4%) and Russia (2.9%). Positive attitudes in FT were expressed
mostly by China (100%) and Russia (94.3%), as well as by the EU (64.7%) and UK (51.9%). There
were also 80% of balanced attitudes toward this solution expressed by the U.S. The UK and EU
expressed 40% and 35.3% of balanced attitudes toward the solution.
Table 5 shows the attitudes that were expressed by international actors in both newspapers
toward the solution to discuss the situation in Syria.
Thus, 71.4% of attitudes toward this solution in K expressed by Russia where positive while
the amount of positive attitudes expressed by EU was 40%. Combined, positive attitudes
constituted 17.1% of all attitudes expressed by the international actors in K. Neutral and balanced
attitudes were expressed in 43.9% and 39% of cases in K correspondingly. Neutral attitudes in K
were expressed by all actors: China (100%), UK (50%), USA (40%), EU (40%), and Russia
(28.6%). Among the international actors who showed balanced attitudes in K, were the USA
(60%), UK (50%), and EU (20%).
The total amount of positive attitudes toward discussing the situation in Syria in FT was 22.3%
while all other attitudes expressed by the international actors were balanced (77.7%).
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All attitudes expressed in FT by Russia and China were positive. USA showed 19.5% of
positive attitudes toward discussing the situation in Syria while UK expressed 9.5% of positive
attitudes toward the solution. EU (100%), UK (90.5%), and USA (80.5%) mostly expressed
balanced attitudes to the solution in FT.
Table 6 shows the information regarding the attitudes expressed both in K and FT toward the
solution to discuss the situation in Syria. It is important to note that there were only 36 valid cases
that show the information related to this solution, which is 3.8% of all the cases presented in the
dataset.
According to the table, 34.8% of attitudes expressed in K were positive, while 65.2% of all
attitudes shown in K were balanced. Positive attitudes were provided by EU (50%) and Russia
(42.9%). All attitudes toward this solution provided in K by the USA and UK were balanced, while
Russia and the EU expressed 57.1% and 50% of balanced attitudes, correspondingly.
In FT, all attitudes expressed by Russia were positive, while all attitudes expressed by the EU
and UK were balanced.
Table 7 shows the attitudes to the cases with no solution provided to the situation. There were
only 43 cases that corresponded to this in the dataset, which is 4.6% of all 938 cases. It is important
to note that this solution was found mostly in K, while FT had less than 1% of corresponding cases
(see Figure 20, mentioned previously).
Most of the attitudes to the situation with no remedy provided were neutral (69.2%) while the
remaining attitudes were balanced (32.5%). EU, China, and “West” expressed 100% of neutral
attitudes, while USA, Russia, and UK showed 69.2%, 68.8%, and 20% of neutral attitudes
correspondingly. Balanced attitudes were expressed by UK (80%), Russia (31.3%), and USA
(30.8%).
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International actors and proposed solutions
Table 8 shows what solutions the U.S. offered to the situation in both newspapers. The three
most popular solutions offered by the U.S. in K were “military measures” (64.5%), “discuss the
situation in Syria” (14.2%), and “no solution” (9.2%). The most popular solutions offered by the
USA in FT were “military measures” (73.9%) as well as to “discuss the situation in Syria” (18.5%).
The solutions provided by the UK are shown on the Table 9 in the appendix. The most popular
solutions provided by the UK in K were “military measures” (52%), “postpone or abandon military
measures” (18%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (12%), and “no remedy” (10%).
The most popular solutions provided by the UK in FT were “military measures” (56.3%),
“postpone or abandon military measures” (27.1%), and “discuss the situation in Syria” (10.6%).
Table 10 shows the solutions provided by the EU toward the situation in Syria. According to
the table, the most popular solutions provided by the EU in K were “military measures” (58.5%),
“postpone or abandon military measures” (9.4%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (9.4%), and “find
a diplomatic solution” (7.5%).
In FT, the most common solutions offered by the EU were “military measures” (55%),
“discuss the situation in Syria” (18.9%), “postpone or abandon military measures” (15.3%), and
“find a diplomatic solution” (7.2%).
Table 11 shows the data on solutions provided by Russia both in K and FT. The three most
frequent solutions found in K were “no solution” (28.1%), “find a diplomatic solution” (24.6%),
and “check the evidence of attack” (22.8%). Such solutions as “discuss the situation in Syria” and
“postpone or abandon military measures” were found in 12.3% of cases each.
The most frequent solutions offered by Russia in FT were “postpone or abandon military
measures” (60.3%), “check the evidence of attack” (22.4%), and “discuss the situation in Syria”
(12.1%).
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Table 12 provides data on the solutions offered by China. The amount of valid cases for this
category was 36, as shown in the table. There were three different solutions provided by China in
K: “discuss the situation in Syria” (50%), “no solution” (33.3%), and “postpone or abandon
military measures” (16.7%). There were also three different solutions provided by China in FT:
“postpone or abandon military measures” (70%), “check the evidence of attack” (16.7%), “discuss
the situation in Syria” (13.3%).
The solutions provided by the collective actor “West” may be found in the Table 13. It is
important to take into account that the amount of valid cases for this category was only 11, which
is 1.2% of all cases in the dataset. The solutions provided by this actor were found in K only. This
actor offered “military measures” in 90.9% of cases and “no solution” in 9.1% of cases.
France and Germany as EU members offered slightly different solutions to the situation. Table
14 shows the data on the solutions offered by France. The most frequent solution provided by
France in K was “military measures” (70.6%). The next most popular solutions were “postpone or
abandon military measures” (8.8%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (5.9%) and “no solution”
(5.9%).
The most frequent solutions in FT were “military measures” (73%) and “discuss the situation
in Syria” (18.9%). Other solutions have been found in less than 3% of cases.
Table 15 shows the information on the solutions offered by Germany. According to the table,
there were only 38 valid cases related to the categories analyzed, which is 4.1% from all the cases
in the dataset.
There were a total of six different solutions offered by Germany in K: “discuss the situation
in Syria” (30%), “find a diplomatic solution” (20%), “postpone or abandon military measures”
(20%), “military measures” (10%), “check the evidence of attack” (10%), and “no solution” (10%).
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In FT, there were a total of four different solutions offered by Germany: “postpone or abandon
military measures” (50%), “find a diplomatic solution” (21.4%), “military measures” (21.4%), and
“check the evidence of attack” (7.1%).
International actor attitudes and context
Table 16 provides the information on how the international actor was portrayed in both
newspapers. According to the table, there were approximately 35% of cases in K when the
international actors in the articles analyzed were portrayed neutral and approximately 63% of cases
when the international actors were portrayed balanced. In FT, the international actors were mostly
portrayed balanced (93.2%).
Russia was portrayed balanced in 78.9% of cases in K, while UK was portrayed balanced in
70% of cases. USA (64.5%) and EU (49.1%) were also among the most frequent cases when the
international actor was portrayed balanced in K. China (83.3%), “West” (63.6%), and EU (49.1%)
were portrayed neutral in most cases in K, while USA (33.3%), UK (26%), and Russia (21.1%)
were portrayed neutral in fewer cases than other actors. It is also important to note that “West”
was portrayed negative in 9.1% of cases in K.
In FT, all international actors except China were portrayed balanced in more than 90% of
cases. China was portrayed balanced in 46.7% of cases and neutral in 53.3% of cases.
Table 17 shows how each particular actor within EU was portrayed in the articles.
According to the table, France was shown as balanced in 50% of cases and neutral in
47.1%, Germany was shown as balanced in 70% of cases and neutral in 30% of cases, while Greece
was shown 50% of the time as balanced and 50% of the time as neutral. All other actors in K were
portrayed neutral.
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In FT, France, Germany, and Italy were portrayed balanced in 97.3%, 92.9%, and 87.5%
of cases correspondingly. Italy and Germany were also portrayed neutral in 12.5% and 7.1% of
cases in FT.
Tables 18-22 show the context found in the articles where each international actor considered
for the analysis was present. According to the Table 18, political context was found in 34% of
cases when USA was mentioned in the articles in K. Military context was found in 58.9% of cases
when USA was mentioned in K, while diplomatic context was observed in 7.1% of cases when
USA was mentioned in K.
In 56.5% of cases in the FT, USA was mentioned in the political context and in 41.2% of
cases, the USA was mentioned in the military context. Diplomatic context in relation to USA was
observed in less than 3% of cases analyzed.
Context found in relation to the UK is shown in the Table 19. According to the table, military
context in relation to the UK was observed in 66% of cases and political context was found in 30%
of cases in The Kommersant. In The Financial Times, political context in relation to UK was
observed in 52% of cases and military context was found in 44.4% of cases.
The context found in relation to the EU is described in the Table 20 in the appendix. According
to this table, military, political, and diplomatic context in relation to the EU in K was observed in
60.4%, 22.6%, and 17% of cases correspondingly. Military and political context in relation to the
EU in FT was found in 66.1% and 30.3% of times from all the cases observed.
Table 21 shows what context was observed in relation to Russia in both newspapers. In K,
Russia was found in the military context in 40.4% of cases observed. Diplomatic context in
connection to Russia was observed in 33.3% of cases, while political context was found in 26.3%
of cases observed in K. Similar numbers were found in FT: diplomatic context was observed in
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37% of cases, military context was observed in 35.2% of cases, and political context was observed
in 27.8% of cases.
Table 22 shows the information on the context observed in relation to each particular EU
member in the dataset. In K, military context was observed in 100% of cases in relation to all EU
members analyzed except of France, Germany, and Greece. Military context in the cases when
France was mentioned in the article was observed in 61.8%, the same context was observed in
relation to Germany in 40% of cases, and in relation to Greece in 50% of cases. In 40% of cases,
diplomatic context was found in the articles where Germany was mentioned and in 50% of articles
where Greece was mentioned, as well as in 8.8% of cases mentioning France. Political context in
relation to France and Germany was found in 29.4% and 20% of cases correspondingly.
Military context in FT was observed in all cases when Italy was mentioned, as well as in
67.9% and 61.1% of cases when Germany and France were mentioned in the articles.
The attitude toward the official Syrian forces by each particular international actor is shown
in the Table 23. According to the table, negative attitudes toward the official Syrian forces were
found in 45.2% of all cases observed in K, balanced attitudes were found in 30.1% of cases, and
neutral attitudes were found in 24.7% of cases observed in The Kommersant. In The Financial
Times, negative attitudes were found in 64.5% of cases, balanced attitudes were found in 38.7%
of cases, and neutral attitudes were found in less than 1% of all cases observed.
Negative attitudes in K were expressed by the UK (51.4%), USA (46.6%), EU (44.1%), and
“West” (40%). Neutral attitudes in K were expressed by China (100%), “West” (60%), Russia
(50%), EU (35.5%), USA (21.4%), and UK (13.5%). Balanced attitudes in K were expressed by
Russia (50%), UK (35.1%), USA (32%), and EU (20.6%).

45

In FT, negative attitudes were expressed by USA (74.8%), EU (59.5%), and UK (55.8%).
Balanced attitudes in FT were also expressed by UK (44.2%), EU (38.7%), and USA (25.2%)
Table 24 shows the attitudes toward Syrian rebels. This data may not be taken into
consideration due to the law amount of valid cases (N=7), which is not a statistically significant
value. The total amount of cases that contained the necessary categories was 0.7% of all the cases
observed.
Individual actor attitudes and context
Table 25 shows the data on how the individual actors are portrayed in the articles analyzed.
According to the table, individual actors were portrayed neutral in more than 25% of articles
in K while in FT individual actors were portrayed neutral in less than 5% of cases observed. The
actors were portrayed balanced in 73.5% of cases in K and in 95.3% of cases in FT.
Actors such as Barack Obama, John Kerry, William Hague, Alexander Lukashevich, Francois
Hollande, and “Undefined actor” were portrayed neutral in more than 30% of cases in The
Kommersant. In The Financial Times, John Kerry was shown neutral in approximately 20% of
cases, while similar percentage was found in K for Chuck Hagel (23.5%) and John Boehner (20%).
Table 26 shows the information on the context where each actor was found in both
newspapers.
According to the figure, the actors in K were found in the political context in 29.5% of cases,
in militaristic context in 59% of cases, and in diplomatic context in 11.4% of cases. The actors
who were most commonly found in the political context were Vladimir Putin (58.3%), Francois
Hollande (50%), Barack Obama (39.6%), and David Cameron (36.8%). The actors most
commonly found in the militaristic context were “Undefined actor” (100%), Chuck Hagel (94.1%),
William Hague (83.3%), Alexandr Lukashevich (75%), John Kerry (65%), David Cameron
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(63.2%), Barack Obama (56.3%), and Francois Hollande (50%). Sergei Lavrov (52.9%) was found
most commonly in the diplomatic context. Less commonly, Alexander Lukashevich (25%), John
Boehner (20%), Vladimir Putin (16.7%), and John Kerry (15%) were observed in the diplomatic
context in K.
In FT, political context was observed in 47.7% of cases, militaristic context was observed in
46% of cases, and diplomatic context was found in 6.1% of cases. Most commonly found in the
political context were actors such as Ed Miliband (94.7%), John Boehner (76.5%), Barack Obama
(57.5%), David Cameron (52%), Francois Hollande (45.7%), Vladimir Putin (44.4%), and John
Kerry (41.7%). In the militaristic context, the most common actors were William Hague (80.8%),
Douglas Alexander (76.5%), Chuck Hagel (72.2%), John Kerry (58.3%), Francois Holland
(54.3%), David Cameron (44%), Vladimir Putin (38.9%), and Barack Obama (36.3%). Most
commonly, Sergei Lavrov (72.7%) and Vladimir Putin (16.7%) were found in the diplomatic
context in FT.
Table 27 shows what cause of the chemical attack was mentioned in the articles by each
particular individual actor. There were four different causes of the attack found in both newspapers
according to the table: Syrian official forces, Syrian rebels, “Undefined” cause, and Third Party
Radical Islamists.
In FT, all actors except of Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov were certain that the only cause
of the chemical attack were Syrian official forces. Both Russian officials did not define the cause
of the attack in the articles analyzed.
In most cases (63.9%) in K individual actors named Syrian official forces as the cause of the
attack, however there were 33.1% of cases where the cause of the attack was not defined by the
individual actors mentioned in the articles observed. Thus, Sergei Lavrov (88.2%), Vladimir Putin
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(58.3%), Alexandr Lukashevich (50%), and “Undefined” actor (50%) were among those who did
not name the cause of the chemical attack. Each individual actor except the four mentioned above
named Syrian official forces as the cause of the attack in more than 70% of cases in K.
Table 28 shows what attitudes toward the Syrian official forces were expressed by each
particular individual actor mentioned in the articles in both newspapers.
In 43.4% of cases in K the actors expressed negative attitudes toward the Syrian official forces,
while in FT negative attitudes were expressed by actors in 74% of cases. In approximately 18% of
cases there were neutral attitudes expressed by the actors in K. Balanced attitudes were found in
38.7% of cases in K and in 26% of cases in FT.
Except Vladimir Putin (0%), Sergei Lavrov (0%), Barack Obama (29.7%), and William
Hague (40%), all actors expressed more than 50% of negative attitudes toward the Syrian official
forces in K. Vladimir Putin (60%), John Boehner (25%), Barack Obama (21.6%), and Francois
Hollande (20%) were among those who expressed most of the neutral attitudes toward the Syrian
official forces in K. Sergei Lavrov (100%), William Hague (60%), Barack Obama (48.6%), and
Vladimir Putin were among those who expressed most of the balanced attitudes toward the cause
in K.
In FT, all actors except Douglas Alexander (23.5%), and John Boehner (47.1%) expressed
more than 75% of negative attitudes toward the Syrian official forces.
Figures 60 and 61 show how the individual actors were portrayed in both newspapers.
According the Table 29, the individual actors were mostly portrayed balanced in FT (95.2%).
John Kerry, Chuck Hagel, and David Cameron were portrayed neutral in 19.4%, 11.1%, and 8%
of cases correspondingly.
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Table 31 shows the data on how the individual actors were portrayed in K. According to the
table, in 26.2% of cases the actors were portrayed neutral, while in 73.8% of cases the actors were
portrayed balanced. Barack Obama (37.5%), Alexander Lukashevich (37.5%), “Undefined” actor
(37.5%), and John Kerry (35%) were portrayed neutral in more than 30% of all cases analyzed.
Sergei Lavrov (100%), David Cameron (89.5%), Vladimir Putin (83.3%), and Chuck Hagel
(76.5%) were mostly portrayed balanced in K.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
This section contains interpretation of the data collected during the analysis and answers the
research questions of this exploratory study. Prior to discussing research questions it is helpful to
discuss the general information received from both newspapers.
General context data discussion
The information in Figure 1 shows that both newspapers had similar periods when the number
of articles describing the situation in Syria increased. There is a possible explanation for these
dynamics. From the day of the chemical attack on August 21 and lasting until August 26 it
remained unclear who was responsible for the action and there were no possible solutions for the
situation yet offered by government officials. After August 26, when it became clear that more
time was necessary to determine the reason and the source of the chemical attack, government
officials from the U.S., UK, EU, Russia, and China started offering solutions to the situation. This
may have led to the increase in the amount of articles published between August 26 and August
30.
After August 30, a slight switch from a militaristic to a political context was observed due to
the political discussions of the situation in the U.S., UK, and France. The question of whether to
use military measures against Bashar al Assad’s regime was being discussed among the political
representatives from these countries. As a result, on August 29, UK’s parliament voted against any
military measures which switched the focus to the U.S. and to a lesser extent to French political
arena, where the president did not require consultation with parliament to decide whether to use a
military response to the situation. During the period from August 31 to September 1 both the U.S.
and France reorganized their cooperation and took into account that the UK was not able to assist
with military response to the chemical attack. After September 1 and until September 4, the day
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when the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg began, the question about the military response to the
situation was discussed in the context of political competition in both the U.S. and France.
However, no solution was found until September 14 when the U.S. secretary of state John Kerry
and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov reached an agreement on eliminating the Syrian
chemical arsenal.
Figures 2 and 3 show that the U.S. was mentioned in most of the cases in both newspapers. A
possible explanation for this information is that after the UK Parliament voted against the military
measures, the main focus switched to the U.S. However, there is no significant difference in how
frequent the U.S. and UK were mentioned in The Financial Times. Since FT is a British newspaper,
it has paid significant attention to the political discussion of the situation before August 29, when
Members of Parliament voted against any military response. This scrutiny in covering the political
competition and debates within the UK Parliament may be the reason why the difference in
frequency of the information about the U.S. and UK in The Financial Times was not significant.
On the other hand, in The Kommersant, Russia was mentioned approximately 25% less than
the U.S. Compared to The Financial Times, Russian political competition was not covered by the
newspaper during this time span and in relation to the situation. Moreover, the Russian Parliament
did not vote and did not discuss any particular solutions to the situation. Even though Russia is
shown in the second position on Figure 2, most of the attention in the newspaper was paid to the
U.S.
There was also a tendency observed in The Kommersant to show one, and less often, two
international actors per article, while there were no sharp differences in how frequently The
Financial Times mentioned one, two, three, four, or five international actors per article. There is a
possible explanation to this data. The articles in FT were significantly longer than the articles in
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K. According to Figures 28 and 29, approximately 70% of all articles in K contained less than 200
words, while more than 90% of articles in FT contained more than 500 words.
There is a similarity in how frequently EU members such as France and Germany were
mentioned in both newspapers. France was found in the articles in both newspapers more than
twice as much as Germany. A possible explanation is that Germany decided to take a neutral
position in the situation by refusing to use military measures against the Syrian official political
regime. As a result, Germany did not vote on the question regarding military response and was not
mentioned in the articles as frequently as France, who planned the military response in coalition
with the U.S. and the UK before it voted against.
Figures 8 and 9 show the context that was used in both newspapers to describe the situation.
The Financial Times has an almost equal divide between the military and political context. This
may be explained by its focus on the political debates in UK, France, and the U.S. where military
response to the situation was discussed. The Kommersant tended to show not only military and
political context, but also the diplomatic context. The reason for this may be Russia’s position on
the situation, which leaned toward a diplomatic solution to the problem. The Kommersant did not
cover political debates in the U.S., UK, and France with the same scrutiny as The Financial Times
did. The length of its articles may be one of the main indicators supporting this explanation.
The Kommersant also tended to mention none, one, or two government officials per article,
while The Financial Times mentioned up to six officials per article. One explanation to this is
article length, which was mentioned previously in the text. Another explanation is an article’s main
information source. Most of the articles in K were simply short paragraphs taken from Russian
news agencies and based on a single information source, while most of the articles in FT were
journalist articles based on more than one information source.
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Responsibility for the attack discussion
When describing the cause of the chemical attack, The Kommersant tended to be more neutral
than The Financial Times and did not define a particular cause. Figure 13 shows that the cause
was not defined in approximately 40% of cases in K, while in 85.5% of cases in FT it was clear
that the cause of the attack was Syrian official forces (see Figure 12). The cases where the cause
in FT was not defined refer to the cases when Russia or its officials were mentioned in the articles
and did not name a specific party responsible for the action. This might be seen as one of the
ideological differences between the two newspapers, because The Kommersant tends not to state
that a particular side is responsible.
The question is whether K tried not to show who is responsible, because it is not politically
“comfortable” distributing such content, or whether K was simply trying to be as neutral in
covering the event as possible and for this reason tended not to name any side as responsible until
proper evidence was available.
Further, there were mostly balanced and neutral attitudes toward the possible cause of the
attack found in K, while mostly negative and balanced attitudes were found in FT. This shows
another ideological difference between the two newspapers. Again, it is not clear whether K tried
to be neutral or whether such topics as the chemical attack in Syria were are not “comfortable”
topics for a media in Russia to discuss. Considering the fact that mostly Russian news agencies
and Russian journalists were the main information sources of the articles in K and that the articles
were rather short in length, it might seem that there are certain rules on how the information related
to the issues where Russian national interest is involved should be presented in the local media.
However, there is no enough evidence to claim this based just on the data collected from a single
Russian newspaper.
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In addition, The Kommersant tended to show mostly general attitudes toward the possible
cause of the attack, thus providing the attitudes without any relation to a particular official. The
Financial Times, on the other hand, tended to relate particular attitudes to particular officials and
was thus more personal in content than K.
This is a significant difference in how the story is told and it also may fall under the ideological
explanation that some solutions to particular situations involving Russian national interests, as well
as attitudes toward these solutions, should not be related to any particular person to reduce the
responsibility and to disclose less information on what exactly is happening; this could be seen as
both state and media “restraint” or “aloofness” from the situation to reduce the responsibility for
any statements, propositions, or actions. However, on the other hand, it may be a sign indicating
that the newspaper is trying to be neutral in covering complex international issues, as well as a
sign indicating that The Kommersant may not be completely under government control due to the
fact that it may publish information that is neutral and not be affected by the official government
position in Russia.
In cases where personal attitudes toward the particular cause of the attack were expressed, the
U.S. officials were mentioned more frequently than others in both newspapers. There was a
significantly larger amount of various sources of personal attitudes found in FT than in K. Second
position in K and FT was allocated to Russian officials and UK officials accordingly. The possible
explanation to this is that both K and FT may have been covering the issue in the context of their
own domestic political environment and for this reason local officials were found in the articles
more frequently than other sources of personal attitudes, except of the U.S. officials. This may be
explained similarly to the explanation offered previously in the text in regard to the international
actors mentioned in the articles. It is assumed that the U.S. and U.S. officials were mentioned more
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frequently due to the fact that main focus switched to the U.S. political arena in the context of the
situation in Syria after the UK Parliament voted against military measures against Syria.
Discussing solutions to the situation and article information sources
Military measures as a solution to the situation were mentioned more frequently in both
newspapers (approximately 50% of all cases according to Figures 20 and 21). However, there is
one significant difference between the solutions offered in both newspapers. According to Figure
21, there were no particular solutions offered in the Kommersant in 12.58% of cases, while there
were less than 0.5% of cases where no solution was offered in the Financial Times.
There might be several reasons for this. From the ideological perspective, this may mean that
K is trying not to mention any particular solutions when possible, thus avoiding responsibility for
publishing information that might not be concordant with Russian state interests thereby reducing
the amount of information that does not coincide with the official government position on the
issue.
Alternatively, this may be explained by the type of information sources and by the type of
content used in the news articles in K. According to the Figure 24, approximately 70% of all the
information used in the articles originated from the Russian news agency or from Russian
journalists. In addition, nearly 10% of the information was taken from various secondary sources,
such as other newspapers, news channels, social media accounts, and other sources. In
approximately 70% of cases, only one information source in K was used; and in approximately
24% of cases two sources of information were used. In addition, almost 70% of all articles in K
consisted of less than 200 words, which does not allow for describing the situation, the problem,
the actor involved, the attitudes, and solutions in deep detail. As a result, some articles may not
contain some parts of the information in the text. On the contrary, FT articles originate mostly
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from journalists, use more information sources per article, and are significantly longer (93.48% of
articles were longer than 500 words). Probably, due to this difference the situation was described
in a more detailed form in FT than in K.
It is not clear, however, what the reason is for using short articles to describe an important
international issue based on the information taken from the local sources. It seems that this form
of news presentation in relation to Syria may be some form of ideological restriction which
imposes a certain way of content delivery by the newspaper to the general public. On the other
hand, this may be a professional and cultural norm for the news coverage in Russia and also a way
in which the newspaper tries to lean toward neutrality in the information delivery. In this case, an
ideological explanation is not enough.
Based on the data received during the analysis, there are probably a combination of
ideological, cultural, and professional reasons that explain why the information in K was presented
in this form. For a deeper analysis it might be helpful to look into previous political, social, cultural,
and geopolitical contexts in which Russia has been embedded, starting from the 1917 revolution
or earlier when 19th century brought with it various reforms introduced by the Russian imperial
government.
Discussing actors and attitudes toward solutions for the situation
Prior to discussing the attitudes expressed by the international and individual actors toward
solutions for the situation, it is important to take a look at the sources of personal attitudes found
in both newspapers. It may be seen from Figures 22 and 23 that ten different sources of personal
attitudes were found in FT, while only six sources of personal attitudes were found in K.
The sources of personal attitudes found in FT include officials from USA, UK, EU, Russia,
and China, as well as local and foreign journalists and experts. In the Kommersant, personal
attitudes from the U.S, Russian, UK, and EU government officials were found, as well as personal
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attitudes from Russian experts and Russian journalists. No personal attitudes from the Chinese
officials, or foreign journalists or experts were found in the articles in K.
Taking into account that more than 50% of all attitudes expressed in K were non-personal
attitudes and that there were no references to any foreign experts or journalists, as well as the fact
that most of the articles in K contained less than 200 words, originated from the local information
sources, and leaned toward neutral and short factual description of the situation rather than indepth coverage showing various points of view on the issue, brings the same conclusions and
possible explanations provided earlier.
This means at least four possible explanations: 1) K may be avoiding publishing certain
information regarding the situation and relating it to particular individuals, 2) K may be avoiding
showing the points of view alternative from the official Russian position on the situation, 3) K may
be trying to be neutral and unbiased toward the situation and thus is mostly describing facts and
official statements made by international actors, 4) there might be a combination of ideological,
cultural, and professional reasons and factors that lead to a certain way of presenting the
information on international issues in Russia, especially where the national interests are involved.
It is interesting, that there were no EU government officials among the most frequently
mentioned individuals in K, while FT mentioned the leaders of the U.S., UK, and France more
frequently than others. This may be explained by the way the information was presented in K and
also by the greater presence of the U.S. and UK in the articles.
According to Table 1, FT tended to show Syrian authorities and official forces in a more
negative way than K did. Syrian authorities were framed as negative in 26.4% of cases in K and in
55.3% of cases in FT. There is a difference of almost 30% between the two newspapers in regard
to this category.
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There is also a similar tendency toward neutrality that was already mentioned previously
found in the Kommersant. Syrian official forces were shown as neutral in approximately 30% of
cases, which is the same amount as the difference between the two newspapers in regard to the
negative attitudes toward the Syrian authorities. As was offered earlier in the text, this may be
explained from the ideological perspective, that the Kommersant may be avoiding showing any
particular attitudes and thus leans toward neutrality due to the ideological restrictions in Russia
that might influence how the content is presented in the articles. However, this also might be a
result of cultural or professional reasons in covering international issues in Russia or a result of
the Kommersant trying to be unbiased and not provide any attitudes and judgements regarding the
situation.
There are also differences in attitudes toward various solutions to the situation offered in both
newspapers. According to Table 2, almost 80% of all attitudes toward the military measures in FT
were positive, while approximately 50% of all attitudes toward the military measures in K were
positive. There is a similar tendency toward neutrality observed in K – approximately 18% of all
attitudes were neutral and approximately 34% of all attitudes were balanced. It seems, that the
Kommersant used an indirect form of reflecting the information on the issue, while the Financial
Times used a direct form of reflecting the information in the articles analyzed. The information
provided in the K articles tended to be non-personal, more abstract, and obscure, while the
information provided by the FT was to a large extent personal, more detailed and transparent.
According to the Tables 2-7, in approximately 70% of cases there were positive or balanced
attitudes in regard toward the possible solutions to the situation found in FT. In K, the attitudes
varied depending on the solution offered. Thus, for solutions such as “military measures”,
“postpone or abandon military measures”, “discuss the situation in Syria”, and “no solution” the
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element of neutrality was observed during the analysis. At the same time, for solutions such as
“check the evidence of attack” and “find a diplomatic solution” the element of neutrality was not
observed in the Kommersant. It should be noted, that the attitudes of the international actor Russia
toward these two latter solutions in FT were close to 100% positive, which may be seen on Tables
3 and 6.
This leads to the possible explanation that positive or negative attitudes in K, i.e. direct rather
than indirect type of presenting the information in the articles, were found specifically for those
types of solutions which were concordant with the Russian foreign policy and official position. At
the same time, the element of neutrality in the Kommersant articles may have been found in regard
to the solutions which were non-concordant or not completely concordant with the Russian foreign
policy and official position. This may be either an ideological restriction that leads to this way of
presenting the information in regard to this issue, or the result of the journalistic standards for the
international issue coverage in Russia. However, more information is necessary to support each
assumption.
Tables 8-15 show the percentage of each solution offered by a particular international actor in
both newspapers. It may be seen from the diagrams, that both newspapers show similar numbers
for each type of solution offered by the international actors. The only significant difference is
between the solutions offered by Russia and China. In both cases, FT emphasizes the solution to
postpone or abandon military measures, while K emphasizes the solutions to check the evidence
of attack, find a diplomatic solution, or “no solution” for Russia, and to discuss the situation in
Syria and “no solution” for China.
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What is important, is that the same tendency of not offering direct and transparent information
in regard to the situation by providing no particular solution was observed in approximately 30%
of cases for both Russia and China in the Kommersant (see Tables 11 and 12).
In addition, a collective actor “West” was mentioned in the Kommersant and was not
mentioned in FT. However, this actor was observed in only 11 cases, which is 1.2% from all the
cases analyzed and is not a statistically significant value. Nevertheless, the fact that this actor was
mentioned in the Kommersant suggesting military measures in approximately 90% of cases and
was not mentioned in the Financial Times needs more attention. The focus of this study does not
allow for making any conclusions related to this fact, however it may be assumed, that this may
be an ideological “trick” which may be used by local journalists and experts to frame the
information in a particular way. To find out how western countries and government officials are
described and whether the same collective actor “West” is mentioned in each international issue
involving these countries it is necessary to analyze articles about other international issues
involving the USA and European countries in Russian newspapers.
Another detail that needs attention is the difference between the international actors within the
European Union. The positions of France and Germany on the issue were significantly different
(see Tables 14 and 15). According to the figures, in approximately 70% of cases France offered
military measures, while Germany offered a combination of various non-military measures which
also constituted approximately 70% combined in both newspapers. The scope of this study does
not allow making any conclusions based on this information, however it may be interesting to
conduct a separate study comparing the positions and attitudes between members of the European
Union on various international issues. Such a study may show whether the difference in the
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positions of certain international actors within the EU toward certain international issues persists
over time and in regard to different international issues.
Discussing attitudes toward the international actors and context
Tables 16 and 17 show the attitudes toward the international actors in both newspapers.
According to the diagrams, the Kommersant tends to frame international actors as neutral in more
than 30% of cases and balanced in more than 60% of cases, while the Financial Times tends to
show the international actors as balanced in more than 90% of cases.
It should be noted, that most of the neutral attitudes toward the international actors in K were
given to EU (49.1%), “West” (63.6%), and China (83.3%). Within the EU, France has received
47.1% of neutral attitudes and Germany has been mentioned in a neutral manner in 30% of cases.
On average all international actors including Russia and China have been portrayed neutral in
approximately 34% of cases.
Taking into account the previous explanations about the tendency to neutrality in the
Kommersant, it may be assumed that this neutrality is based on the form in which the content is
provided in the articles by the Kommersant. A significant number of articles were general, nonpersonal, and consisted of less than 200 words which may not be enough to describe each
international actor and their attitudes toward the situation in a more detail. This may be the reason
why the actors were portrayed neutral – most of the articles simply mentioned the basic facts, the
problem, and the actors involved without describing what the actors proposed and how they tried
to manage the situation in Syria. There might be an ideological (avoiding responsibility due to
ideological restrictions) or a professional (trying to be unbiased in covering the issue) reason for
presenting the information in this way in the Kommersant. In addition, China and “West” have
been mentioned only 1.89% and 3.46% of times among all the cases observed in K, which is
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probably an additional reason why they were portrayed neutral in relatively more cases than other
international actors. The actors who were mentioned more frequently were portrayed neutral in
fewer cases than China and “West”.
The reason for the Financial Times to portray the international actors as balanced may be
related to the way in which the content was presented in the articles analyzed. Most of the articles
were longer than 500 words which allows for describing each actor and its position in regard to
the situation in more detail and providing balanced attitudes and evaluations to the solutions and
recommendations proposed.
It might be also important to look into the context in which international actors were
mentioned in both newspapers. Tables 18-22 show the context for each international actor
analyzed.
Thus, the USA was mentioned mostly in militaristic context in K, while it was mostly
mentioned in political context in FT. This may be explained by the fact that the Financial Times
covered the inside political debates regarding the solutions toward the situation in Syria in more
detail, while the Kommersant did not focus on the inside political process neither in the U.S., UK,
or EU. Moreover, from Figure 49 it may be seen that FT mentioned USA in the military context
in approximately 40% of cases which is approximately 18% less cases than in K. Taking into
account that K did not focus on the political competition within the U.S., but rather focused on the
solutions that the U.S. offered, it may explain this difference.
Similar explanations may apply to the UK and EU as both these actors were also mentioned
mostly in the militaristic context in K and mostly in political context in FT.
As for Russia, it was portrayed almost identically in both K and FT, according to the Table
27. FT paid more attention to both national and international context in which each actor was
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mentioned, while K did not pay significant attention to the national context of each actor except
Russia due to the fact that K is a Russian newspaper and local context probably was described
more precisely for this reason. As for China, it was decided not to consider the context in which it
was mentioned due to the low amount of total cases where it was observed (N=36 of 938).
There were also some differences in the context where Germany and France were mentioned
in both newspapers. France was portrayed in the political context in 29.4% of cases in K and in
38.9% of cases in FT, which makes approximately 9% difference between K and FT. There were
almost identical numbers found for France being mentioned in the militaristic context in both
newspapers. Probably, this high number is a result of the French position on Syria. France took
the place of the UK in promoting military response toward the Syrian government after the UK
Parliament voted against any military involvement in the situation on August 29.
Germany was found in the political context in approximately 20% of cases in both
newspapers, although there were differences between the militaristic and diplomatic context
between K and FT. The Financial Times tended to show Germany mostly in militaristic context
(approximately 70% of cases), while K showed Germany equally both in militaristic and
diplomatic context (40% of cases for each category).
Probably, in this case, FT may have been avoiding showing Germany in a diplomatic context
while leaning toward mentioning it in the military context instead. There is not enough evidence
to make any sound conclusions based on this data, however it might be interesting to analyze
whether there might be some ideological biases or preferences in FT. The Financial Times is a
British newspaper and due to the cultural and ideological preferences of journalists or editors some
content involving the U.S., UK, and EU in relation to the similar international issues may be
presented through the similar frame for each of these actors. All EU members that where analyzed
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in FT were mentioned mostly in the militaristic context, according to Figure 53, which “blurs” the
difference between them by making similar to each other as members of the European Union.
Table 23 shows the attitudes toward the Syrian official forces by each international actor. It
may be seen that FT tends to show Syrian authorities in a more negative way than K does. There
were 65.5% of cases in FT and 45.2% of cases in K where Syrian authorities were shown as
negative. Most negatively Syrian authorities were described by the U.S. in FT (74.8% of cases).
Even though Syrian authorities were framed more negatively in the Financial Times, the
Kommersant showed them as neutral in 24.7% of cases which is close to the difference in the
negative attitudes between K and FT. The Syrian authorities were shown balanced in 30.1% and
35.2% of cases in K and FT accordingly.
The trend toward neutrality was observed in multiple instances in K and was already
mentioned previously in the text. Based on Table 23 it is not possible to conclude that K is avoiding
presenting some part of the information that may be “uncomfortable” according to the Russian
political interests and political context, however this data provides additional argument toward this
direction of thought. In order to make a sound conclusion it is necessary to analyze more articles
related to other similar international issues published in the Kommersant to support this
assumption.
Table 24 shows the attitudes toward the Syrian forces, however only 7 cases were observed,
which is not a statistically significant value and is not enough to provide any interpretations.
Tables 25-31 show how the government officials were portrayed in the articles and in what
context they were mentioned both in The Kommersant and in The Financial Times.
Both newspapers did not show any positive or negative attitudes toward the government
officials, however both neutral and balanced attitudes were observed. There was a similar trend

64

toward neutrality observed in the Kommersant (26.5% of cases) as in previous instances. Neutral
attitudes in FT were observed in 4.7% of cases. All U.S., UK, and EU officials in K where shown
more neutral than in FT. This may be explained in a similar manner as the explanations given
previously regarding the content in the Kommersant: 1) this may be due to the form in which
content is presented in K (short non-personal articles repeating the facts from the news agencies,
thus not providing detailed information with several perspectives on the position of each
government official); 2) this may be a result of ideological constraints in Russia in relation to the
international issues where Russian foreign policy is involved affecting the way information is
presented in K; 3) this may be a result of cultural and professional journalistic norms in Russia (K
is trying to be unbiased and thus the trend toward neutrality is observed in approximately 30% of
cases related to this international issue).
Table 26 shows that approximately 60% of all government officials were mentioned in the
militaristic context in K, while the government officials in FT were mentioned approximately 45%
of the time each in the political and militaristic context. This may be explained by the in-depth
coverage of the political debates in FT involving each individual actor, while K did not thoroughly
cover political debates in the U.S., UK, and EU countries. As a result, K tended to show individual
actors in the militaristic rather than the political context compared to FT.
It is also important to consider the difference between the Kommersant and the Financial
Times in regard to the cause of the attack. All of the most mentioned actors, except Vladimir Putin,
Sergei Lavrov, and Alexander Lukashevich tended not to name any particular cause of the attack
or, in the case of Alexander Lukashevich to blame Syrian rebels (37,5%) or third party radical
Islamists (12,5%). It may be assumed that since both Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov are
international public figures, they probably represent the official Russian position on the situation.
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Especially when taking into account the difference between Putin and Lavrov, it may be assumed
that as a president, Putin tended to be more balanced in finding one party or the other responsible
for the attack (in approximately 40% of cases Syrian official forces were named as responsible).
On the contrary, Lavrov, as a Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs tended not to point at any side
and probably for this reason did not define who exactly was responsible for the attack in
approximately 88% of cases.
There is not enough evidence to make any sound conclusions to explain the reason of this
behavior, however it may be assumed that Lavrov, similarly to Putin, also avoids naming any side
as responsible and is trying to be neutral and unbiased. This is very similar to the tendency to
neutrality previously found in the Kommersant. It is not very clear whether this is a style of
reporting in K aimed to reduce bias, whether this is a result of the ideological preferences of the
Russian official government position, or whether this is a result of the ideological restrictions for
the media when covering international issues similar to the Syrian crisis.
In the Financial Times, both Putin and Lavrov did not name any side responsible for the attack,
while the actors from USA, UK, and EU did name Syrian official forces responsible for the
chemical attack. Thus, based on the result of both newspapers, it may be assumed that the result
of Russian officials being neutral is rooted in the Russian government position on Syria and in this
way may be seen as an ideological issue. To confirm this assumption and also to compare whether
similar uniformity of the U.S., UK, and EU officials will be present in other newspapers it may be
necessary to compare these data with the information presented on the same international issue in
the EU and U.S. newspapers that cover similar topics as K and FT.
According to Table 28, the government officials in K tend to be neutral and balanced toward
the Syrian government (more than 55% of cases combined), while the government officials in FT
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tend to be negative toward the Syrian government (74% of cases). This is similar to the general
attitudes found in both newspapers, which is shown in Figures 12 and 13.
Comparing Table 28 and Figure 13 one may see approximately a 20% difference in neutral
attitudes. Based on this data, it may be assumed that the tendency toward neutrality in K may be a
result of the ideological restraints originating from the Russian political environment. The data
presented here does not allow for making any sound conclusions on this matter, however it seems
based on the findings that the less foreign international actors are mentioned in the articles the
more a tendency toward neutrality prevails, which seems to be in concordance with the position of
the Russian government officials toward the cause of the attack shown in the Table 27. To check
this assumption, more international issues should be analyzed and compared in both newspapers
to see whether this assumption stays true.
Answering the research questions
The first research question (RQ1) asked whether the Financial Times would frame Syrian
opposition in a more positive way than the Kommersant. According to the data gathered during
the analysis, it may be said that there were not enough cases found in the articles to answer this
question. The total amount of cases that contained the information on the Syrian opposition was 7
out of 938 which does not allow for comparing two newspapers on this issue. However, the focus
of this study looked on the international actors from the U.S., UK, EU, Russia, and China involved
into the issue, but did not focus on the cases when other actors were present. If analyzing the cases
where international actors from other regions, as well as local and Middle Eastern authorities,
international agencies, and other international and supranational bodies are involved, the analysis
may render a different result. This may be a focus that further research on the issue may be
employed for analysis purposes.
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The second research question (RQ2) asked whether the Kommersant would frame Syrian
authorities in a more positive way than the Financial Times. Based on the results, it may be said
that the Kommersant framed Syrian authorities in a less negative way rather than in a more positive
one. According to the findings, attitudes toward the Syrian authorities in FT were more negative
than in K. The Syrian authorities were framed as negative in the Kommersant in approximately
45% of all the cases where attitudes toward this category were expressed, while the same category
was framed as negative in the Financial Times in approximately 65% of cases according to Table
1. No positive attitudes were found in both newspapers. K tended also to frame the Syrian
authorities as neutral or balanced (approximately 55% combined), while FT also farmed Syrian
authorities as balanced (in approximately 35% of cases). Thus, the answer that K framed the Syrian
authorities less negatively than FT, rather than more positively, better suits this case.
The third research question (RQ3) asked whether the Kommersant would frame Russian and
Chinese officials in a more positive way than the Financial Times. In regard to this question, it
may be stated that it is not possible to evaluate the attitudes toward the Chinese officials in the
articles due to the fact that less than 1% of corresponding cases was observed during the analysis.
On the other hand, it is possible to respond to this question in regard to how Russian officials were
framed in both newspapers.
There were two Russian officials found in FT (Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov) that were
mentioned in more than 3% of cases, others were not considered for the purpose of this study. Both
officials were portrayed balanced in 100% of cases, thus not being framed either in a positive or a
negative way. In K, three Russian officials who were mentioned more than 3% of times were found
(Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, and Alexander Lukashevich). Sergei Lavrov was portrayed
balanced in 100% of cases, while Vladimir Putin was portrayed balanced in 83.3% of cases and
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neutral in 16.7% of cases, according to Table 25. Aleksandr Lukashevich was portrayed balanced
in the Kommersant in 62.5% of cases and neutral in 37.5% of cases.
Thus, in regard to this question it may be said that Russian officials were framed more neutral
rather than more positive in the Kommersant than in the Financial Times, where they were framed
as balanced in 100% of cases. The results may not be completely accurate due to the possibility of
sampling and methodology errors and restrictions, however they show the tendency toward
neutrality that was observed previously for the data received from the Kommersant articles. Both
newspapers did not show negative or positive evaluations of the government officials. It might be
interesting, however, to analyze the same officials in the context of other international issues
covered by both newspapers to see whether the same tendency prevails.
Additionally, it is important to note, that the USA, UK, EU, and “West” as international actors
in general were framed less positively in K than in FT according to the Table 2. As mentioned
previously in the discussion, a significant amount of articles in K mentioned none or only few
international actors, as well as officials per article. The articles in K were also rather short
compared to FT, which may not allow thorough description of the issue compared to FT where the
articles contained information on more actors and officials due to the fact that they were
significantly longer.
RQ4 asked whether the Financial Times would frame the U.S., UK, and EU officials in a more
positive way than the Kommersant. According to the Table 25, the Kommersant tended to frame
the U.S., UK, and EU officials in a more neutral way than the Financial Times. Thus, FT framed
the officials in a more balanced, rather than in a more positive way than K. The number of neutral
evaluations in K varied from 10.5% (David Cameron) to 37.5% (Barack Obama), while in FT there
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were only two categories with more than 10% of neutral evaluations found for the U.S., UK, and
EU officials: Chuck Hagel (11.1%) and John Kerry (19.4%).
It should be noted that only the officials who were present in 3% or more cases were
considered, while other officials were not considered for the analysis. The figures might be slightly
different if considering all the officials and if analyzing other international issues in both
newspapers. However, the present data indicates the trend toward neutrality in the Kommersant
that was mentioned previously in the discussion section. Additionally, the article length and the
total amount of international actors and officials mentioned per article in both newspapers should
be considered in regard to this research question.
RQ5 asked which of the newspapers will emphasize sanctions and military measures toward
Syrian authorities among the possible solutions to the issue.
It may be seen from Figures 20 and 21 that military measures as a solution in K were
mentioned in 49.69% of cases while 54.35% of cases in FT showed this solution, thus it may be
assumed based on this information that neither newspapers directly avoided mentioning this
solution in the articles. However, the Kommersant provided no solution to the situation in 12.58%
of cases and offered non-military solutions in approximately 35% of cases. FT mentioned no
solution to the situation in less than 1% of cases and non-military measures as a solution in
approximately 44% of cases. The fact that no remedy was mentioned in K may be seen as a
tendency to avoid emphasizing any solutions, but it may not be stated what exact type of solutions
was avoided to emphasize by the newspaper. On the other hand, this may also be seen as a result
of how the content was presented in the Kommersant. As was mentioned above, the articles were
rather short and general in the description of the events, while the Financial Times tended to
provide a more detailed coverage of the events in longer articles.
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Additionally, if broken down by particular international actors, it may be seen that the
Kommersant tended to be more neutral and balanced when mentioning military measures than the
Financial Times. According to Table 2, military measures were framed as positive in 48.1% of
cases in K, while this solution to the situation was framed as positive in 78% of cases by FT in the
cases when international actors were mentioned. No negative attitudes toward military measures
were observed in K, while negative attitudes were observed in FT in 0.6% of cases analyzed. It is
also important to note, that neither Russia nor China suggested military measures as a solution to
the situation. This information may be seen as an indirect argument toward the assumption that the
Kommersant avoided emphasizing military measures as a solution to the situation in the articles
analyzed. However, it is not enough to affirmatively answer this question based on the data
gathered from this study.
To support this assumption, it is necessary to compare the content of both newspapers on other
international issues where Russian national interests were involved. For example, the recent
conflict in Ukraine, the conflicts in Chechnya, and the war in Georgia in 2008 may be a good way
to test this assumption and to show whether the numbers show similar results on this matter.
RQ6 asked whether any information covered by one newspaper was not covered by another
newspaper.
According to the findings, FT did cover with great scrutiny the political processes related to
the issue that took place in UK, the U.S., and France, while K did not pay significant attention to
the political processes in any of these countries. A few short notes mentioning that some political
actions took place in these countries were present in the Kommersant, however this information
did not mention particular actions and processes taking place, as well as it did not show the political
debates from the insider perspective as FT did.
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Additionally, K added more of the Russian political context when covering the issue than FT
where Russian political decisions and processes related to the issue were not discussed to such
extent. The Kommersant covered more Russian officials than FT did, similarly to how FT covered
more American and European officials in relation to the issue than K. This may be seen concordant
with the concept of “domestication of news” that was mentioned in the literature review and theory
section of this work.
Also, K introduced a new collective actor “West” which was used as a very broad term to
address the countries that were not on the Russian side of the spectrum in regard to the situation.
However, it was interesting that in one article this term was used to address allies, but at the same
time left Germany as an international actor aside from the definition due to the fact that Germany
proposed diplomatic rather than military solution to the situation.
Compared to the Kommersant, the Financial Times in approximately 99.5% of cases offered
some solutions while the Kommersant described no solutions in more than 12% of cases. This may
be seen as a way of not completely covering the issue by K, as a way of being partly “aloof” from
the problem that is mentioned in the article. Similarly, this “aloofness” may be seen in the tendency
to neutrality in coverage and in the way the content was presented (i.e. the presence of short general
articles with no or few international actors mentioned).
Thus, while covering the issue, each newspaper added more of local political context and
sometimes used slightly different focus in relation to the situation in the news coverage.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This work was intended to compare media frames between the Kommersant and the Financial
Times regarding the chemical attack that took place in Syria on August 21, 2013. It was an
exploratory study that should allow reorganizing the methodology in order to come up with more
systematic approach. The analysis focused on the possible politico-ideological differences
between the two newspapers as well as tested the methodology for the comparative framing
analysis that may be employed for further comparative studies in media framing on international
issues.
As a result, 938 references that fall into the defined criteria were observed and analyzed using
the proposed methodological tool. The criteria included predefined international actors involved
in the event (USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China), the chemical attack of August
21, 2013 mentioned in the articles, and international decisions regarding the chemical attack
described in the article. Some important trends in the news coverage used by both newspapers
were found during the analysis that may be helpful for future studies.
First, the tendency toward neutrality in presenting the information was observed in the articles
published by the Kommersant while the Financial Times tended to be more balanced in presenting
the information on the issue. Second, the majority of the articles in the Kommersant were less than
200 words, while the articles in FT mostly contained more than 500 words. Third, the Kommersant
used one, and less frequently, two information sources in the articles analyzed, while FT tended to
use more sources for the publication. Fourth, the K articles were mostly written by journalists who
stayed in Russia, rather than by foreign correspondents who were based in the regions where the
events took place; the articles published in FT were written both by local and foreign
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correspondents. Fifth, the articles in K tended to be general and non-personal, while the articles
published in FT tended to be more personal and more detailed in presenting the information.
This tendency toward neutrality combined with the way the information was presented in the
articles creates the base for several assumptions. Taking into account the abovementioned factors,
it may be assumed that K tended to either avoid publishing some information, or to be as neutral
in the news coverage as possible.
If aligning with the first explanation, this may mean that K was avoiding publishing some
information due to the possible ideological restrictions or political context in Russia. This may be
true in case that some type of censorship on the international issues involving Russian national
interest may exist in Russia and thus may be a part of the local political environment. This may
explain the reason why mostly Russian news agencies and local journalists were used as news
sources for the stories. However, the scope of this study does not allow for confirmation of this
assumption and more research on the Russian political and ideological context in relation to the
media coverage is necessary to support this assumption.
On the contrary, if aligning with the second explanation, this may mean that there might be
some professional or cultural journalistic norms in the country that impose certain way of the
information representation on the international issues that is considered to be unbiased. This may
explain the tendency of mentioning plain facts from the news agencies without providing various
perspectives on the issue from multiple sources in a single article by the Kommersant. In this case,
more research on the Russian professional journalistic routines and cultural norms of the news
coverage in historical perspective may be necessary to provide some sound conclusions.
In regard to the research questions, the study showed that both newspapers tended not to give
negative or positive evaluations to international actors and officials when covering the issue, thus
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being mostly neutral or balanced in the way they framed the actors. Also, the study showed that
the Kommersant tended to frame Syrian authorities in a less negative way than FT, rather than
farming them in a more positive way. Instead of showing them in a more positive way, K tended
also to show them more in a neutral or balanced way.
Additionally, based on the results, it may be assumed that neither FT nor K tended to directly
emphasize or avoid emphasizing certain types of solutions toward the situation, such as military
or non-military measures. However, this is only true if considering all the cases from the dataset.
If looking more precisely at the breakdown of the solutions offered by each international actor per
newspaper, it may be seen that the same solutions are ascribed to a particular actor with a difference
in their attitudes toward these solutions. This means that the international actors in FT tended to
be more positive toward the military measures, while the same international actors in K tended to
be more neutral and balanced in attitudes toward the military measures as a solution to the
situation.
The results also showed that some information that was covered by one newspaper was not
covered by another. Thus, FT tended to cover with a great scrutiny the political processes related
to the issue that took place in the UK, U.S., and France and to the officials from these regions,
while K did not pay significant attention to the political processes in either of these countries.
Conversely, K tended to pay more attention to the political events in Russia than FT did.
Additionally, the Kommersant mentioned more Russian officials in regard to the issue, similarly
to the Financial Times who published more information on the officials from the U.S., UK, and
EU. These findings are concordant with the concept of “domestication of news” which may be
used to explain the reason why the information was presented in this particular way.
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Also, the Kommersant used a collective actor “West” that had a broad meaning, but
presumably was introduced to address the U.S., UK, and EU allies that were not on the Russian
side of the spectrum in regard to the situation. Finally, a certain share of “aloofness” was observed
in the articles published by the Kommersant due to the fact that the information in some cases
tended to be incomplete when no solutions to the problem were provided in the text. In contrast to
the Kommersant, the Financial Times provided at least one solution in approximately 99.5% of
cases.
In regard to the methodological approach, it may be said that with minor changes and
amendments this methodology may be used to gather the information in the future comparative
framing studies on international issues and conflicts. Compared to the original methodology
provided by Entman (first, identifying issue, event, and actors; second, identifying frame
functions: problem, cause, remedy/solution, judgment/attitude), this study also employed the
category of “context/rhetoric” to show the contextual environment or discourse in which the
categories proposed by Entman may be found. The study also looked at the type of
attitudes/judgments (personal vs. general) and the source of personal attitudes/judgments found in
the stories; as well as on the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used for each story,
and for the length of articles published both in the Financial Times and the Kommersant.
Thus, based on the Entman’s methodology, the proposed analytical tool allows more scrutiny
by providing additional insights on the context and type of content used by a medium. Thus, it
may also be helpful not only for comparing the content, but also for deriving certain assumptions
that tend to explain the reasons why the content is presented in each medium in one way or another.
This tool, however was designed to analyze the text, not visual or audial content. However, it
may be used as a base for creating a tool for analyzing both audial and visual content as well.
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There are some additional limitations to this study and methodology. First, the study lacks
intercoder reliability and thus should be considered a pilot. Second, this study analyzed a single
issue, chemical attack in Syria, which is not enough to generalize the results and to claim that the
way information was presented in regard to this issue in each newspaper is generally presented
this way both in FT and K. To make this claim it is necessary to analyze how both newspapers
cover other conflicts where Russian or UK national interests are involved. Such issues as the war
in Iraq in 2003, the wars in Chechnya, the war in Georgia in 2008, and the present civil war in
Ukraine may be good cases to compare.
Also, to make claims that political, ideological, cultural, or professional environment in either
the UK or Russia may have an impact on the way information is presented in the articles, it may
be necessary to provide a more detailed background on the historical, cultural, and professional
context that may influence the work of media, journalists, or editors in a given country. In addition,
a detailed background on the political systems and processes, media environment, geopolitical
orientation and ideological doctrines of each country should be thoroughly considered to make
claims whether any element of a particular environment may affect media coverage and to what
extent it may be true.
Moreover, performing comparative studies on international issues, especially on war conflicts
such as the Syrian Crisis, may be beneficial not only to the scientific pull of knowledge, but may
also be a means of decreasing subjectivity and ideological stereotypes of both readers and
journalists. Showing discrepancies in story frames on the same issue may help in explaining how
various factors, such as different ideological, cultural, and professional contexts may decrease
objectivity and thus reinforce stereotypes and limited perceptions toward particular political,
social, or cultural groups to a wider audience.
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Substantial amount of research on international issues already exists. However, the process
of informing a wider audience all over the world is gradual and the eventual purpose may not be
achieved by conducting a single study. The research on the crossroads of different ideological,
cultural, and professional attitudes is a way to compare these attitudes and to explain why such
attitudes exist, what logic is inherent to them. Comparative studies in communication are mirrors
of a contemporary, multifaceted world and they help to bring awareness and understanding of the
same events from multiple perspectives.
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Figure 1. Number of articles per day32

32

The figure shows the amount of articles published in the Kommersant and the Financial Times during August 21st
and September 4th were selected for the analysis
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Figure 2. Breakdown by international actor in the Kommersant33

Figure 3. Breakdown by international actor in the Financial Times34

33
34

Figure 2 shows what international actors were found in the Kommersant during the analysis
Figure 3 shows what international actors were found in the Financial Times during the analysis
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Figure 4. Number of actors per article in the Financial Times35

Figure 5. Number of actors per article in the Kommersant36

35
36

Figure 4 shows how many international actors per article were found in the Financial Times during the analysis
Figure 5 shows how many international sctors per article were found in the Kommersant during the analysis
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Figure 6. Breakdown by the EU members in the Kommersant37

Figure 7. Breakdown by the EU members in the Financial Times38

37
38

Figure 6 shows what members of the EU were found in the the Kommersant articles during the analysis
Figure 7 shows what members of the EU were found in the the Financial Times articles during the analysis
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Figure 8. Context in the Financial Times39

Figure 9. Context in the Kommersant40
39
40

Figiure 8 shows the contaxt that was observed regarding the chemical attack in Syria in the Financial Times
Figiure 9 shows the contaxt that was observed regarding the chemical attack in Syria in the Kommersant

90

Figure 10. Number of officials in the Kommersant41

Figure 11. Number of officials in the Financial Times42

41
42

Figure 10 shows how many government officials per article were found in the Kommersant
Figure 11 shows how many government officials per article were found in the Financial Times
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Figure 12. Cause of the attack in the Financial Times43

Figure 13. Cause of the attack in the Kommersant44

43
44

Figure 12 shows what cause of the attack was mentioned in the Kommersant articles analyzed
Figure 13 shows what cause of the attack was mentioned in the Financial Times articles analyzed

92

Figure 14. Attitude toward the cause of the attack in the Financial Times45

Figure 15. Attitude toward the cause of the attack in the Kommersant46
45
46

Figure 14 shows what attitudes toward the cause of the attack were found in the Financial Times
Figure 15 shows what attitudes toward the cause of the attack were found in the Kommersant
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Figure 16. Type of attitude toward the cause in The Financial Times47

Figure 17. Type of attitude toward the cause in The Kommersant48

47
48

Figire 16 shows how many personal and general attitudes were found in the Financial Times articles
Figire 17 shows how many personal and general attitudes were found in the Kommersant articles

94

Figure 18. Personal attitude toward the cause in The Kommersant49

49

Figure 18 shows what government officials and individual actors provided attitudes toward the cause of the attack
in the Kommersant
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Figure 19. Personal attitude toward the cause in The Financial Times50

50

Figure 19 shows what government officials and individual actors provided attitudes toward the cause of the attack
in the Financial Times
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Figure 20. Solutions offered in The Financial Times51

51

Figure 20 shows what solutions were offered in the Financial Times in regard to the chemnical attack in Syria
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Figure 21. Solutions offered in The Kommersant52

52

Figure 21 shows what solutions were offered in the Kommersant in regard to the chemnical attack in Syria
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Figure 22. Personal attitudes toward the solutions in The Financial Times53

53

Figiure 22 shows what individual actors provided personal attitudes in regard to the solutions to the situation
offered after the chemical attack in Syria in the Financial Times
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Figure 23. Personal attitudes toward the solutions in The Kommersant54

54

Figiure 23 shows what individual actors provided personal attitudes in regard to the solutions to the situation
offered after the chemical attack in Syria in the Kommersant
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Figure 24. Primary information sources in The Kommersant55

55

Figure 24 shows what were the primary information sources that were used in the Kommersant
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Figure 25. Primary information sources in The Financial Times56

56

Figure 25 shows what were the primary information sources that were used in the Financial Times

102

Figure 26. Number of sources in The Financial Times57

Figure 27. Number of sources in The Kommersant58

57
58

Figure 26 shows how many sources per article were used in the Financial Times
Figure 27 shows how many sources per article were used in the Kommersant
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Figure 28. Article length in The Kommersant59

Figure 29. Article length in The Financial Times60

59
60

Figure 28 shows how long were the articles in the Kommersant that were analyzed
Figure 29 shows how long were the articles in the Financial Times that were analyzed
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Figure 30. Government officials in The Kommersant61

61

Figure 30 shows what government officials were found in the Kommerasnt articles in regard to the chemical
attack in Syria
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Figure 31. Government officials in The Financial Times62

62

Figure 31 shows what government officials were found in the Financial Times articles in regard to the chemical
attack in Syria
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Table 1. Cause * Attitude toward the cause * Newspaper crosstabulation63
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Cause_agent *
Attitude_toward_the_cause_ag

938

100.0%

0

0.0%

938

100.0%

ent * Newspaper

Cause_agent * Attitude_toward_the_cause_agent * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% of Total
Attitude_toward_the_cause_agent
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
Cause_agent

Syrian official forces

26.4%

Syrian rebels
Undefined

1.6%

Neutral

17.6%

58.5%

0.6%

1.3%

1.9%

14.5%

23.3%

39.3%

0.3%

0.3%

Islamists)

The Financial Times

Cause_agent

Syrian official forces

Cause_agent

28.0%

29.6%

42.5%

100.0%

55.3%

0.3%

30.2%

85.8%

Syrian rebels

0.2%

Undefined

0.3%

0.2%

13.5%

14.0%

55.8%

0.5%

43.7%

100.0%

45.5%

5.1%

25.9%

76.5%

Syrian rebels

0.1%

0.2%

0.4%

0.7%

Undefined

0.7%

5.0%

16.8%

22.6%

0.1%

0.1%

43.3%

100.0%

Total
Total

Total

14.5%

Third Party (Radical

Total

Balanced

Syrian official forces

0.2%

Third Party (Radical
Islamists)
Total

46.4%

63

10.3%

Table 1 shows what attitudes toward each particular potencial cause of the chemical attack in Syria were
mentioned in both the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 2. International actor * Attitude toward military measures * Newspaper
crosstabulation64
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_the_military_

495

52.8%

443

47.2%

938

100.0%

measures* Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_the_military_measures * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_the_military_measures
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
International_Actor

International_Actor

Total

14.3%

39.6%

100.0%

UK

57.7%

19.2%

23.1%

100.0%

EU

54.8%

12.9%

32.3%

100.0%

West

20.0%

60.0%

20.0%

100.0%

48.1%

17.7%

34.2%

100.0%

USA

81.1%

18.9%

100.0%

UK

71.4%

28.6%

100.0%

3,3%

82.0%

14.8%

100.0%

0,6%

78.0%

21.4%

100.0%

Total
International_Actor

Balanced

46.2%

EU

Total

Neutral

USA

Total
The Financial Times

Positive

USA

68.6%

5.1%

26.3%

100.0%

UK

68.8%

3.6%

27.5%

100.0%

72.8%

4.3%

20.7%

100.0%

20.0%

60.0%

20.0%

100.0%

68.5%

5.7%

25.5%

100.0%

EU

2,2%

West
Total

0,4%

64

Table 2 shows what attitudes toward military measures against the Syrian regime were expressed by each
international actor both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 3. International actor * Attitude toward checking the cause of attack *
Newspaper crosstabulation65
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_

62

Check_the_evidence*

6.6%

876

93.4%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Check_the_evidence * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_Check_the_evidence
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
International_Actor

USA
UK

100.0%

100.0%

EU

100.0%

100.0%

61.5%

38.5%

100.0%

41.7%

58.3%

100.0%

USA

16.7%

33.3%

16.7%

33.3%

100.0%

80.0%

10.0%

10.0%

100.0%

25.0%

75.0%

100.0%

7.7%

100.0%

EU
Russia

92.3%

China

100.0%

Total
International_Actor

Total
100.0%

UK

Total

Balanced
71.4%

Total
International_Actor

Neutral

28.6%

Russia

The Financial Times

Positive

USA

2.6%

71.1%

7.9%

18.4%

100.0%

7.7%

30.8%

7.7%

53.8%

100.0%

66.7%

8.3%

25.0%

100.0%

16.7%

83.3%

100.0%

23.1%

100.0%

UK
EU
Russia

76.9%

China

100.0%

Total

1.6%

65

100.0%

59.7%

100.0%
4.8%

33.9%

100.0%

Table 3 shows what attitudes toward the solution to check the evidence of the chemical attack in Syria were
expressed by each international actor both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 4. International actor * Attitude toward postponing/abandoning military
measures * Newspaper crosstabulation66
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_Postpone/
abandon_military_measures*

158

16.8%

780

83.2%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Postopone/abandon_military_measures * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_Postpone/
abandon_military_measures
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
International_Actor

Positive

USA
UK

11.1%

88.9%

100.0%

40.0%

100.0%

Russia

14.3%

28.6%

57.1%

100.0%

100.0%
7.7%

USA
7,4%

EU
Russia

2,9%

China

23.1%

100.0%
69.2%

100.0%

20.0%

80.0%

100.0%

51.9%

40.7%

100.0%

64.7%

35.3%

100.0%

94.3%

2.9%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
International_Actor

100.0%

40.0%

UK

Total

100.0%

20.0%

Total
International_Actor

Balanced

EU

China

The Financial Times

Neutral

Total

3,8%
USA
UK

6,3%

EU
Russia

2,4%

China
Total

3,2%

66

100.0%

71.2%

25.0%

100.0%

11.1%

88.9%

100.0%

44.4%

1.6%

47.6%

100.0%

54.5%

9.1%

36.4%

100.0%

81.0%

4.8%

11.9%

100.0%

95.5%

4.5%

60.8%

3.8%

100.0%
32.3%

100.0%

Table 4 shows what attitudes toward the solution to postpone or abandon military measures against the Syrian
regime were expressed by each international actor both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 5. International actor * Attitude towrd discussing the situation
* Newspaper crosstabulation67
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_discussing_th

135

14.4%

803

85.6%

938

100.0%

e_situation * Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_discussing_the_situation * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_discussing_the_situati
on
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Positive
International_Actor

60.0%

100.0%

UK

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

20.0%

100.0%

EU

40.0%

40.0%

Russia

71.4%

28.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

17.1%

43.9%

100.0%

19.5%

80.5%

100.0%

UK

9.5%

90.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Russia

100.0%

100.0%

China

100.0%

100.0%

Total
International_Actor

39.0%

USA

EU

Total

Total

40.0%

Total
International_Actor

Balanced

USA

China

The Financial Times

Neutral

22.3%

77.7%

100.0%

USA

13.1%

13.1%

73.8%

100.0%

UK

7.4%

11.1%

81.5%

100.0%

EU

7.7%

7.7%

84.6%

100.0%

Russia

85.7%

14.3%

100.0%

China

57.1%

42.9%

100.0%

20.7%

13.3%

Total

67

65.9%

100.0%

Table 5 shows what attitudes toward the solution to discuss the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were
expressed by each international actor both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 6. International actor * Attitude toward diplomatic solution * Newspaper
crosstabulation68
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_finding_a_dip

36

3.8%

902

96.2%

938

100.0%

lomatic_solution * Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_diplomatic_solution * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_the
diplomatic_solution
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Positive
International_Actor

International_Actor

100.0%

100.0%

UK

100.0%

100.0%

EU

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

Russia

42.9%

57.1%

100.0%

34.8%

65.2%

100.0%

UK

100.0%

100.0%

EU

100.0%

100.0%

Russia
Total
Total

International_Actor

Total

USA

Total
The Financial Times

Balanced

100.0%
23.1%

100.0%
76.9%

100.0%

USA

100.0%

100.0%

UK

100.0%

100.0%

EU

16.7%

83.3%

100.0%

Russia

52.9%

47.1%

100.0%

30.6%

69.4%

100.0%

Total

68

Table 6 shows what attitudes toward the diplomatic solution to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria
were expressed by each international actor both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 7. International actor * Attitude toward no solution * Newspaper
crosstabulation69
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_no_solution *

43

4.6%

895

95.4%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_no_solution * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_no_solution
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Neutral
International_Actor

International_Actor

69.2%

30.8%

100.0%

UK

20.0%

80.0%

100.0%

EU

100.0%

International_Actor

100.0%

Russia

68.8%

China

100.0%

100.0%

West

100.0%

100.0%

67.5%
USA

Total
Total

Total

USA

Total
The Financial Times

Balanced

31.3%

32.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

USA

75.0%

25.0%

100.0%

UK

20.0%

80.0%

100.0%

EU

100.0%

100.0%

Russia

68.8%

China

100.0%

100.0%

West

100.0%

100.0%

Total

69.8%

69

31.3%

30.2%

100.0%

100.0%

Table 7 shows what attitudes toward the situation in Syria were expressed by each international actor both in the
Kommersant and the Financial Times in cases when no particular solutions were offered
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Table 8. International actor * Attitude toward diplomatic solution * Newspaper
crosstabulation70
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Remedy*International_ActorU
SA * Newspaper

Missing
Percent

363

N

38.7%

Total

Percent
575

N

61.3%

Percent
938

100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_USA * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_USA
International_A
ctor_USA
Newspaper
The Kommersant

USA
Remedy

Military measures

64.5%

64.5%

Check the evidence of attack

5.0%

5.0%

Postpone/abandon military measures

2.8%

2.8%

Move marine forces to the Mediterranian

2.1%

2.1%

14.2%

14.2%

Find a diplomatic solution

2.1%

2.1%

No remedy

9.2%

9.2%

100.0%

100.0%

73.9%

73.9%

Check the evidence of attack

2.7%

2.7%

Postpone/abandon military measures

2.3%

2.3%

Supply rebels with defence weapons

1.4%

1.4%

18.5%

18.5%

1.4%

1.4%

100.0%

100.0%

Discuss the situation in Syria

Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Total

Military measures

Discuss the situation in Syria
No remedy
Total

70

Table 8 shows what attitudes toward the diplomatic solution afetr the chemical attack in Syria were expressed by
each international actor both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 9. Solution* International actor UK * Newspaper crosstabulation71
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Remedy*International_Actor_U
K*Newspaper

Missing
Percent

249

N

26.5%

Total

Percent
689

N

73.5%

Percent
938

100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_UK * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_UK
International
Actor_UK
Newspaper
The Kommersant

UK
Remedy

Military measures

52.0%

52.0%

4.0%

4.0%

18.0%

18.0%

12.0%

12.0%

4.0%

4.0%

10.0%

10.0%

100.0%

100.0%

56.3%

56.3%

5.0%

5.0%

27.1%

27.1%

10.6%

10.6%

1.0%

1.0%

100.0%

100.0%

55.4%

55.4%

4.8%

4.8%

25.3%

25.3%

10.8%

10.8%

Find a diplomatic solution

1.6%

1.6%

No remedy

2.0%

2.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Check the evidence of attack
Postpone/abandon military
measures
Discuss the situation in Syria
Find a diplomatic solution
No remedy
Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Military measures
Check the evidence of attack
Postpone/abandon military
measures
Discuss the situation in Syria
Find a diplomatic solution

Total
Total

Remedy

Military measures
Check the evidence of attack
Postpone/abandon military
measures
Discuss the situation in Syria

Total

71

Total

Table 9 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by the UK
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Table 10.
crosstabulation72

Solution*

International

actor

EU

*

Newspaper

Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Remedy*International_Actor
_EU*Newspaper

Missing

Percent
164

N

17.5%

Total

Percent
774

N

Percent

82.5%

938

100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_EU * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_EU
International_A
ctor_EU
Newspaper
The Kommersant

EU
Remedy

Military measures

58.5%

58.5%

Check the evidence of attack

3.8%

3.8%

Postpone/abandon military measures

9.4%

9.4%

Supply rebels with defence weapons

1.9%

1.9%

Move marine forces to the Mediterranian

1.9%

1.9%

Discuss the situation in Syria

9.4%

9.4%

Find a diplomatic solution

7.5%

7.5%

No remedy

5.7%

5.7%

Impose sanctions on Syrian regime

1.9%

1.9%

100.0%

100.0%

55.0%

55.0%

3.6%

3.6%

Postpone/abandon military measures

15.3%

15.3%

Discuss the situation in Syria

18.9%

18.9%

7.2%

7.2%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Military measures
Check the evidence of attack

Find a diplomatic solution
Total

72

Total

Table 10 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by the EU
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Table 11. Solution* International actor Russia * Newspaper crosstabulation73
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Remedy*International_Actor_Rus
sia*Newspaper

Missing
Percent

115

N

12.3%

Total

Percent
823

N

87.7%

Percent
938

100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_Russia * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_Russia
International
Actor_Russia
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Russia
Remedy

Check the evidence of attack

22.8%

22.8%

12.3%

12.3%

Discuss the situation in Syria

12.3%

12.3%

Find a diplomatic solution

24.6%

24.6%

No remedy

28.1%

28.1%

100.0%

100.0%

22.4%

22.4%

60.3%

60.3%

12.1%

12.1%

5.2%

5.2%

100.0%

100.0%

Postpone/abandon military
measures

Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Check the evidence of attack
Postpone/abandon military
measures
Discuss the situation in Syria
Find a diplomatic solution

Total

73

Total

Table 11 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by Russia
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Table 12. Solution * International actor China * Newspaper crosstabulation74
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Remedy *
International_Actor_China *

36

3.8%

902

96.2%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

Remedy * International_Actor_China * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_China
International
Actor_China
Newspaper
The Kommersant

China
Remedy

Postpone/abandon military measures

16,7%

16.7%

Discuss the situation in Syria

50.0%

50.0%

No remedy

33.3%

33.3%

100.0%

100.0%

Check the evidence of attack

16.7%

16.7%

Postpone/abandon military measures

70.0%

70.0%

Discuss the situation in Syria

13.3%

13.3%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Total

74

Total

Table 12 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by China
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Table 13. Solution * International actor “West” * Newspaper crosstabulation75
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Remedy *
International_Actor_West *

11

1.2%

927

98.8%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

Remedy * International_Actor_West * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_West
International_Act
or_West
Newspaper
The Kommersant

West
Remedy

Military measures
No remedy

Total
Total

Remedy

Military measures
No remedy

Total

75

Total
90.9%

90.9%

9.1%

9.1%

100.0%

100.0%

90.9%

90.9%

9.1%

9.1%

100.0%

100.0%

Table 13 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by the collective
actor “West”
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Table 14. Solution * International actor France * Newspaper crosstabulation76
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Remedy * EU_France *

Missing
Percent

108

Newspaper

N

11.5%

Total

Percent
830

88.5%

N

Percent
938

100.0%

Remedy * EU_France * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within EU_France
EU_France
Newspaper
The Kommersant

France
Remedy

Military measures

70.6%

70.6%

Check the evidence of attack

2.9%

2.9%

Postpone/abandon military measures

8.8%

8.8%

Supply rebels with defence weapons

2.9%

2.9%

Discuss the situation in Syria

5.9%

5.9%

No remedy

5.9%

5.9%

Impose sanctions on Syrian regime

2.9%

2.9%

100.0%

100.0%

73.0%

73.0%

Check the evidence of attack

2.7%

2.7%

Postpone/abandon military measures

2.7%

2.7%

18.9%

18.9%

2.7%

2.7%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Military measures

Discuss the situation in Syria
Find a diplomatic solution
Total

76

Total

Table 14 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by France
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Table 15. Solution * International actor Germany * Newspaper crosstabulation77
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Remedy * EU_Germany *

Missing
Percent

38

Newspaper

N

4.1%

Total

Percent
900

95.9%

N

Percent
938

100.0%

Remedy * EU_Germany * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within EU_Germany
EU_Germany
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Germany
Remedy

Military measures

10.0%

10.0%

Check the evidence of attack

10.0%

10.0%

Postpone/abandon military measures

20.0%

20.0%

Discuss the situation in Syria

30.0%

30.0%

Find a diplomatic solution

20.0%

20.0%

No remedy

10.0%

10.0%

100.0%

100.0%

21.4%

21.4%

7.1%

7.1%

Postpone/abandon military measures

50.0%

50.0%

Find a diplomatic solution

21.4%

21.4%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Remedy

Military measures
Check the evidence of attack

Total

77

Total

Table 15 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offerd by Germany
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Table 16. International actor * How the actor is portrayed * Newspaper crosstabulation78
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
How_the_int_actor_is_portaye

938

100.0%

0

0.0%

938

100.0%

d * Newspaper

International_Actor * How_the_int_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
How_the_int_actor_is_portayed
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
International_Actor

33.3%

64.5%

100.0%

UK

4.0%

26.0%

70.0%

100.0%

EU

1.9%

49.1%

49.1%

100.0%

Russia

21.1%

78.9%

100.0%

China

83.3%

16.7%

100.0%

9.1%

63.6%

27.3%

100.0%

2.2%

34.6%

63.2%

100.0%

USA

2.3%

97.7%

100.0%

UK

5.5%

94.5%

100.0%

EU

5.4%

94.6%

100.0%

5.2%

93.1%

100.0%

53.3%

46.7%

100.0%

6.6%

93.2%

100.0%

Russia

1.7%

China
Total

78

Total

2.1%

Total
International_Actor

Balanced

USA

West

The Financial Times

Neutral

0.2%

Table 16 shows how each particular international actor was porteayed in each newspaper
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Table 17. EU member * How the actor is portrayed * Newspaper crosstabulation79
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
EU_Member*How_the_int_actor
_is_portayed*Newspaper

Missing

Percent
161

N

17.2%

Total

Percent
777

N

82.8%

Percent
938

100.0%

EU_Member * How_the_int_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within EU_Member
How_the_int_actor_is_portayed
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
EU_Member

France

2.9%

EU_Member

Total

50.0%

100.0%

Germany

30.0%

70.0%

100.0%

Greece

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

Denmark

100.0%

100.0%

Croatia

100.0%

100.0%

Romania

100.0%

100.0%

Latvia

100.0%

100.0%

Cyprus

100.0%

100.0%

2.0%

49.0%

49.0%

100.0%

France

2.7%

97.3%

100.0%

Germany

7.1%

92.9%

100.0%

12.5%

87.5%

100.0%

4.5%

95.5%

100.0%

Italy
Total

79

Balanced

47.1%

Total
The Financial Times

Neutral

Table 17 shows how each particular EU member was porteayed in each newspaper
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Table 18. Context * International actor USA * Newspaper crosstabulation80
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Context_words_category *
International_Actor_USA *

362

38.6%

576

61.4%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

Context_words_category * International_Actor_USA * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_USA
International_Act
or_USA
Newspaper
The Kommersant

USA
Context_words_category

Political_rhetoric

34.0%

34.0%

Militaristic_rhetoric

58.9%

58.9%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

7.1%

7.1%

100.0%

100.0%

Political_rhetoric

56.6%

56.6%

Militaristic_rhetoric

41.2%

41.2%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

2.3%

2.3%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Context_words_category

Total

80

Total

Table 18 shows in what context was international actor USA found in each newspaper
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Table 19. Context * International actor UK * Newspaper crosstabulation81
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Context_words_category *
International_Actor_UK *

248

26.4%

690

73.6%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

Context_words_category * International_Actor_UK * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_UK
International_Act
or_UK
Newspaper
The Kommersant

UK
Context_words_category

Political_rhetoric

30.0%

30.0%

Militaristic_rhetoric

66.0%

66.0%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

4.0%

4.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Political_rhetoric

52.0%

52.0%

Militaristic_rhetoric

44.4%

44.4%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

3.0%

3.0%

Humanitarian_rhetoric

0.5%

0.5%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Context_words_category

Total

81

Total

Table 19 shows in what context was international actor UK found in each newspaper
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Table 20. Context * International actor EU * Newspaper crosstabulation82
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Context_words_category *
International_Actor_EU *

162

17.3%

776

82.7%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

Context_words_category * International_Actor_EU * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_EU
International_Act
or_EU
Newspaper
The Kommersant

EU
Context_words_category

Political_rhetoric

22.6%

22.6%

Militaristic_rhetoric

60.4%

60.4%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

17.0%

17.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Political_rhetoric

30.3%

30.3%

Militaristic_rhetoric

66.1%

66.1%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

3.7%

3.7%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Context_words_category

Total

82

Total

Table 20 shows in what context was international actor EU found in each newspaper
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Table 21. Context * International actor Russia * Newspaper crosstabulation83
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Context_words_category *
International_Actor_Russia *

111

11.8%

827

88.2%

938

100.0%

Newspaper

Context_words_category * International_Actor_Russia * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor_Russia
International_Act
or_Russia
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Russia
Context_words_category

Political_rhetoric

26.3%

26.3%

Militaristic_rhetoric

40.4%

40.4%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

33.3%

33.3%

100.0%

100.0%

Political_rhetoric

27.8%

27.8%

Militaristic_rhetoric

35.2%

35.2%

Diplomatic_rhetoric

37.0%

37.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Context_words_category

Total

83

Total

Table 21 shows in what context was international actor Russia found in each newspaper
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Table 22. EU member * Context * Newspaper crosstabulation84
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid

EU_Member*Context_words
_category*Newspaper

Missing

Total

N

Percent

N

Percent

N

Percent

159

17.0%

779

83.0%

938

100.0%

EU_Member * Context_words_category * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within EU_Member
Context_words_category
Political

Militaristic

Diplomatic

rhetoric

rhetoric

rhetoric

Total

France

29.4%

61.8%

8.8%

100.0%

Germany

20.0%

40.0%

40.0%

100.0%

Greece

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

Denmark

100.0%

100.0%

Croatia

100.0%

100.0%

Romania

100.0%

100.0%

Latvia

100.0%

100.0%

Cyprus

100.0%

100.0%

Newspaper
The Kommersant

EU_Member

Total
The Financial Times

EU_Member

23.5%

60.8%

France

38.9%

61.1%

Germany

17.9%

67.9%

Italy
30.6%

14.3%

65.7%

Table 22 shows in what context was each particular EU member found in each newspaper
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100.0%
100.0%

100.0%

Total

84

15.7%

100.0%
100.0%

3.7%

100.0%

Table 23. International actor * Attitude toward Syrian official forces * Newspaper
crosstabulation85
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

International_Actor *
Attitude_toward_Syrian

718

76.5%

220

23.5%

938

100.0%

official_forces * Newspaper

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within International_Actor
Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
International_Actor

Total

46.6%

21.4%

32.0%

100.0%

UK

51.4%

13.5%

35.1%

100.0%

EU

44.1%

35.3%

20.6%

100.0%

Russia

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

China

100.0%

100.0%

40.0%

60.0%

100.0%

45.2%

24.7%

Total
International_Actor

Balanced

USA

West

The Financial Times

Neutral

30.1%

100.0%

USA

74.8%

25.2%

100.0%

UK

55.8%

44.2%

100.0%

EU

59.5%

1.8%

38.7%

100.0%

64.5%

0.4%

35.2%

100.0%

Total

85

Table 23 shows the attitudes expressd by each particular international actor toward official Syrian forces in the
Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 24. International actor * Attitide toward Syrian rebels * Newspaper86
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
International_Actor*Attitude_toward_
Syrian_rebels*Newspaper

Missing

Percent
7

0.7%

86

N

Total

Percent
931

99.3%

N

Percent
938

100.0%

Table 24 shows the attitudes expressd by each particular international actor toward Syrian rebel forces in the
Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 25. Government official * How the actor is portrayed * Newspaper crosstabulation
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall *
How_the_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper

Missing

Percent
529

56.4%

N

Total

Percent
409

N

43.6%

Percent
938

100.0%

% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
How_the_actor_is
portrayed
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Neutral

Total

Actor_Person_shortlist_

Vladimir Putin

16.7%

83.3%

100.0%

overall

Barack Obama

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov
John Kerry

35.0%

65.0%

100.0%

David Cameron

10.5%

89.5%

100.0%

Chuck Hagel

23.5%

76.5%

100.0%

William Hague

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

Alexandr Lukashevich

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

Francois Hollande

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

John Boehner

20.0%

80.0%

100.0%

Undefined

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

26.5%

73.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

98.8%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

19.4%

80.6%

100.0%

8.0%

92.0%

100.0%

11.1%

88.9%

100.0%

3.8%

96.2%

100.0%

Francois Hollande

100.0%

100.0%

Douglas Alexander

100.0%

100.0%

John Boehner

100.0%

100.0%

Ed Miliband

100.0%

100.0%

95.3%

100.0%

Total
The Financial Times

Balanced

Actor_Person_shortlist_

Vladimir Putin

overall

Barack Obama

1.3%

Sergei Lavrov
John Kerry
David Cameron
Chuck Hagel
William Hague

Total

4.7%

131

Table 26. Government official * Context * Newspaper crosstabulation87
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall *

Missing

Percent
529

Context_words_category * Newspaper

56.4%

N

Total

Percent
409

N

43.6%

Percent
938

100.0%

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Context_words_category * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
Context_words_category
Political Militaristic Diplomatic
Newspaper
The Kommersant

rhetoric
Actor Person

rhetoric

rhetoric

Humanitarian
rhetoric

Total

Vladimir Putin

58.3%

25.0%

16.7%

100.0%

Barack Obama

39.6%

56.3%

4.2%

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov

17.6%

29.4%

52.9%

100.0%

John Kerry

20.0%

65.0%

15.0%

100.0%

36.8%

63.2%

100.0%

5.9%

94.1%

100.0%

16.7%

83.3%

100.0%

David
Cameron
Chuck Hagel
William
Hague
Alexandr

75.0%

Lukashevich
Francois

50.0%

Hollande
John Boehner

50.0%

80.0%

Undefined

25.0%

100.0%
20.0%

100.0%

Total

29.5%

87

59.0%

100.0%

100.0%
100.0%

11.4%

100.0%

Table 26 shows in what context was each particular government official found both in the Kommersant and the
Financial Times

132

Table 26. Continued: Government official * Context * Newspaper crosstabulation
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Context_words_category * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
Context_words_category
Political Militaristic Diplomatic Humanitarian
Newspaper
The Financial

rhetoric
Actor Person

Times

rhetoric

rhetoric

rhetoric

Total

Vladimir Putin

44.4%

38.9%

16.7%

100.0%

Barack Obama

57.5%

36.3%

6.3%

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov

27.3%

72.7%

100.0%

John Kerry

41.7%

58.3%

52.0%

44.0%

27.8%

72.2%

7.7%

80.8%

45.7%

54.3%

17.6%

76.5%

John Boehner

76.5%

23.5%

100.0%

Ed Miliband

94.7%

5.3%

100.0%

47.7%

46.0%

David
Cameron
Chuck Hagel
William
Hague
Francois
Hollande
Douglas
Alexander

Total
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100.0%
4.0%

100.0%
100.0%

7.7%

3.8%

100.0%

100.0%

5.9%

6.1%

100.0%

0.3%

100.0%

Table 27. Government official * Cause of the attack * Newspaper crosstabulation88
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall *
Cause_agent * Newspaper

Missing
Percent

529

N

56.4%

Total

Percent
409

N

43.6%

Percent
938

100.0%

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Cause_agent * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
Cause_agent
Syrian

Newspaper
The Kommersant Actor_Person

Third Party

official

Syrian

forces

rebels

(Radical
Undefined

Islamists)

Total

Vladimir Putin

41.7%

58.3%

100.0%

Barack Obama

77.1%

22.9%

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov

5.9%

88.2%

100.0%

5.9%

John Kerry

85.0%

15.0%

100.0%

David Cameron

73.7%

26.3%

100.0%

Chuck Hagel

82.4%

17.6%

100.0%

William Hague

83.3%

16.7%

100.0%

Alexandr

37.5%

Lukashevich

50.0%

12.5%

100.0%

Francois Hollande

83.3%

16.7%

100.0%

John Boehner

80.0%

20.0%

100.0%

Undefined

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

Total

63.9%

88

2.4%

33.1%

0.6%

100.0%

Table 27 shows what cause of chemical attack was suggested by each particular government official both in the
Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 27. Continued: Government official * Cause of the attack * Newspaper
crosstabulation
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Cause_agent * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
Cause_agent
Syrian

Newspaper
The Financial

Actor_Person

Times

Third Party

official

Syrian

forces

rebels

Vladimir Putin

(Radical
Undefined
100.0%

Barack Obama

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov

Islamists)

Total
100.0%
100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

John Kerry

100.0%

100.0%

David Cameron

100.0%

100.0%

Chuck Hagel

100.0%

100.0%

William Hague

100.0%

100.0%

Francois Hollande

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

John Boehner

100.0%

100.0%

Ed Miliband

100.0%

100.0%

Douglas
Alexander

Total

92.0%
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8.0%

100.0%

Table 28. Government official * Attitude toward Syrian official forces * Newspaper
crosstabulation89
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall *

440

Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper

Missing

Percent

N

46.9%

498

Percent
53.1%

Total
N

Percent

938

100.0%

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces
Newspaper
The Kommersant

Negative
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall

Vladimir Putin
Barack Obama

29.7%

Neutral

Balanced

Total

60.0%

40.0%

100.0%

21.6%

48.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov
John Kerry

58.8%

11.8%

29.4%

100.0%

David Cameron

57.1%

14.3%

28.6%

100.0%

Chuck Hagel

57.1%

14.3%

28.6%

100.0%

William Hague

40.0%

60.0%

100.0%

Francois

60.0%

20.0%

20.0%

100.0%

John Boehner

50.0%

25.0%

25.0%

100.0%

Undefined

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

38.7%

100.0%

Hollande

Total

43.4%

89

17.9%

Table 28 shows what attitudes toward official Syrian forces were expressed by each particular government official
both in the Kommersant and the Financial Times
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Table 28. Continued: Government official * Attitude toward Syrian official forces *
Newspaper crosstabulation
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall
Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces
Newspaper
The Financial

Negative
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall

Times

Neutral

Balanced

Total

Barack Obama

78.8%

21.3%

100.0%

John Kerry

91.7%

8.3%

100.0%

David Cameron

78.7%

21.3%

100.0%

Chuck Hagel

88.9%

11.1%

100.0%

William Hague

84.6%

15.4%

100.0%

91.3%

8.7%

100.0%

23.5%

76.5%

100.0%

47.1%

52.9%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

26.0%

100.0%

Francois
Hollande
Douglas
Alexander
John Boehner
Ed Miliband
Total

74.0%
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Table 29. Government official * How the actor is portrayed * The Financial Times90
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis *

Percent
352

How_the_actor_is_portayed

Missing

37.5%

N

Total

Percent
586

N

62.5%

Percent
938

100.0%

Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis * How_the_actor_is_portrayed Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis
How_the_actor_is_portrayed
Neutral
Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis

Vladimir Putin

Total

100.0%

100.0%

1.3%

98.8%

100.0%

19.4%

80.6%

100.0%

8.0%

92.0%

100.0%

11.1%

88.9%

100.0%

3.8%

96.2%

100.0%

Francois Hollande

100.0%

100.0%

Douglas Alexander

100.0%

100.0%

John Boehner

100.0%

100.0%

Ed Miliband

100.0%

100.0%

95.2%

100.0%

Barack Obama
John Kerry
David Cameron
Chuck Hagel
William Hague

Total

90

Balanced

4.8%

Table 29 shows hwo each particular government official was portrayed in the Financial Times
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Table 30. Government official * How the actor is portrayed * The Kommersant91
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Actor_Person_K_shortlist_analysis *
How_the_actor_is_portrayed

Missing

Percent
149

15.9%

N

Total

Percent
789

N

84.1%

938

Percent
100.0%

Actor_Person_K_shortlist_analysis * How_the_actor_is_portrayed Crosstabulation
% within Actor_Person_K_shortlist_analysis
How_the_actor_is_portrayed
Neutral

Total

Actor_Person_K_shortlist

Vladimir Putin

16.7%

83.3%

100.0%

analysis

Barack Obama

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Sergei Lavrov
John Kerry

35.0%

65.0%

100.0%

David Cameron

10.5%

89.5%

100.0%

Chuck Hagel

23.5%

76.5%

100.0%

Alexandr Lukashevich

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

Undefined

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

26.2%

73.8%

100.0%

Total

91

Balanced

Table 30 shows hwo each particular government official was portrayed in the Kommersant
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Table 31. Data collection coding sheet92
1. Newspaper

2. Event

3. International actor

4. N of
actors

Kommersant=1

Chemical attack=1

USA=1

1=1

UK=2

2=2

EU=3

3=3

Russia=4

4=4

China=5

5=5

The FT=2

"West" (collective actor)=6

92

6. Actor Person

6. Actor Person

6. Actor Person

Vladimir Putin=1

Emma Bonino=23

Hillary Clinton=45

Barack Obama=2

John Baron=24

Keith Ellison=46

Sergei Lavrov=3

John Boehner=25

Bob Corker=47

John Kerry=4

Vladimir Titov=26

Marie Harf=48

James Cameron=5

Sarah Wollaston=27

Gennadiy Gatilov=50

Angela Merkel=6

Ed Miliband=28

Alain Vidlies=51

Steffen Seibert=7

David Davis=29

Philip Hammond=52

Guido Westerwelle=8

Douglas Carswell=30

Vladimir Chizhov=53

Chuck Hagel=9

John McCain=31

Alexei Pushkov=54

Nick Clegg=10

Sir Malcolm Rifkind=32

Valentina Matvienko=55

William Hague=11

Tim Farron=33

Xi Jinping=56

Alexandr Lukashevich=12

Robert Menendez=34

Denis McDonough=57

Joe Biden=13

Ron Johnson=35

Jean-Marc Ayrault=58

Susan Rice=14

John Day=36

Undefined=99

John Brenann=15

Wang Yi=37

Martin Dempsey=16

Maajid Nawaz=38

Samantha Power=17

Nancy Pelosi=39

Francois Holland=18

Jean-Louis Borloo=40

Laurent Fabius=19

George Osborne=41

Josh Earnest=20

Manuel Valls=42

Douglas Alexander=21

Jean-Marc Ayrault=43

Lord Ashdown=22

Eric Cantor=44

Table 31 shows the coding sheet that containes the categories used during the data collection process
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Table 31. Continued: Data collection coding sheet
5. EU Member

9. Context/rhetoric

EU as a whole=1

Political context/rhetoric=1

13. Attitude toward the
cause/agent

France=2

Militaristic context/rhetoric=2

Negative=1

Germany=3

Diplomatic context/rhetoric=3

Positive=2

Italy=4

Humanitarian context/rhetoric=4

Neutral=3

Greece=5

Balanced=4

Denmark=6
10. N of actor persons in the article

14. Type of attitude cause/agent

Croatia=7

1=1

General=1

Romania=8

2=2

Personal=2

Latvia=9

3=3

Cyprus=10
7. How the actor person is
portrayed

…

15. Personal attitude cause/agent

12=12

UK journalist=1

…

Russian journalist=2

None=99

Foreign journalist (other)=3

Negative=1

UK expert=4

Positive=2

Russian expert=5

Neutral=3

11. Problematic effects/conditions

Foreign expert (other)=6

Balanced=4

Use of chemical weapons=1

U.S. official=7
Russian official=8

8. How the international
actor is portrayed

12. Cause/agent

UK official=9

Syrian official forces=1

EU official=10

Syrian rebels=2

Chinese official=11

Negative=1

Undefined=3

Positive=2

Third party (Radical Islamists)=4

Neutral=3
Balanced=4
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Table 31. Continued: Data collection coding sheet
16. Solution to the
situation

19. Personal attitude
solution

Military measures=1
Check the evidence of
attack=2
Destroy Syrian chemical
arsenal=3
Postpone/abandon
military measures=4
Supply rebels with
defense weapons=5

23. Date

UK journalist=1

21. Number of
sources

Russian journalist=2

1=1

August 22=22

Foreign journalist (other)=3

2=2

August 23=23

UK expert=4

3=3

August 24=24

Russian expert=5

4=4

August 25=25

Move marine forces to
the Mediterranean=6
Discuss the situation in
Syria=7
Find a diplomatic
solution=8

Foreign expert (other)=6

5=5

August 26=26

U.S. official=7

6=6

August 27=27

Russian official=8

…

August 28=28

UK official=9

22. Article length

August 29=29

No remedy=9
Impose sanctions on
Syrian regime=10
17. Attitude toward the
solution

EU official=10

Under 100 words=1

August 30=30

Chinese official=11

100-200 words=2

August 31=31

200-300 words=3

September 1=111

August 21=21

Negative=1

20. Primary information
source

300-400 words=4

September 2=222

Positive=2

Middle East correspondent=1

400-500 words=5

September 3=333

Neutral=3

Russian correspondent=2

Above 500 words=6

September 4=444

Balanced=4

UK correspondent=3
U.S. correspondent=4

18. Type of attitude
toward the solution

China correspondent=5

General=1

EU news agency=7

Personal=2

Russian news agency=8

EU correspondent=6

U.S. news agency=9
Middle Eastern news
agency=10
British news agency=11
Chinese news agency=12
Secondary information
source (e.g. TV (Al
Arabiya))=13
Expert article=14
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